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RIGHTS, REMEDIES, AND THE QUANTUM AND BURDEN OF PROOF

Joelle Anne Moreno*
ABSTRACT

It is tempting to commemorate the 2014 centenary of the
exclusionary rule by celebrating our historically
progressive role in constitutional rights protection, but
those familiar with the facts know that Fourth Amendment
violations persist unabated. As New Yorkers consider
Judge Scheindlin's damning assessment ofpolice stop-andfrisk practices,and the country erupts in protestsfollowing
fatalpolice encounters, are legal scholars who continue to
pontificate on constitutional bona fides addressing "real"
FourthAmendment questions?
Traditional academic abstraction and artificial doctrinal
divides obscure the fact that rights and remedies are
defined by their operation. Constitutionalrights have no
value if after they have been violated,meaningful remedies
are unattainable. This Article focuses instead on the
functional relationshipbetween rights and remedies and on

*Jolle Anne Moreno is the Associate Dean for Faculty Research & Development

and a Professor of Law at Florida International College of Law. For my mother, who is of
course not Tina Fey, but might once have shared the same hopes for her daughter:
Lead her away from Acting but not all the way to Finance.
Something where she can make her own hours but still feel
intellectually fulfilled and get outside sometimes
And not have to wear high heels.
Tina Fey,

BOSSYPANTS

262 (2011).
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new constraints imposed by judicial recalibrationsof the
quantum and burden of remedialproof
The Roberts Court's recent shotgun wedding linking
exclusion to defense evidence establishingpolice officer
"bad faith" or systemic police negligence illustrates the
centrality of proof and evidence questions. Over the past
few years, the Court has increased the quantum of defense
suppressionproof while simultaneously eliminatingburden
shifting to the prosecution. These shifts make most Fourth
Amendment violations irremediable. It is not feasible to
demand that defendants aggregate data establishing
systemic police negligence. Defendants who seek, in the
alternative, to prove that an illegal search was committed
knowingly, recklessly, or with gross negligence invariably
lack direct evidence of police officer intent. By changing
the rules governing suppression under the guise of a
narrowfocus on deterrence, the Roberts Court has ensured
that nearly all illegally seized evidence will be admitted.
The only time evidence will be suppressed is when a
defendant can prove circumstantially that police
misconduct was so patently egregious that defense evidence
supports a judicialinference ofpolice "badfaith."
In theory, the Roberts Court has quietly eraseda century of
exclusion jurisprudence while eliding accountability for
more overt action. In practice, if suppression is only
available to defendants who can prove flagrantpolice "bad
faith," the Court has effectively resurrected the old due
process "shocks the conscience" exclusion standard.New
decisions illustrating the type of police behavior that can
support an inference of badfaith under include patently
race-based seizures, near-suspicionless repeated rectal
searches, and (in a truly unforgettable case) the curbside
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excision of contrabandfrom a suspect 's penis performed by
the arrestingofficer.
The full impact of increasing the quantum and reallocating
the burden of proof is fully revealed in recent empirical
studies demonstrating that illegally seized evidence is now
routinely admitted. Prosecutors' new, easy access to this
evidence following warrant-based and warrantless
searches will transform not just the small number of cases
that go to trial, but plea calculations in every case where
evidence was previously excludable on FourthAmendment
grounds.

91
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INTRODUCTION

T

his year marks the centenary of the exclusionary rule. 1 Once

considered a constitutional mandate, the rule has fallen on hard times,
and rumors of its death may not have been greatly exaggerated. 2 While
reasonable academic minds continue to debate its constitutional bona
fides, ' the close of the exclusionary rule century precipitates more
pressing concerns. Judge Shira A. Scheindlin's recent rejection of New
York City's stop-and-frisk program reveals that many police officers
1 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).

2 Four decades ago, Justice Brennan characterized the Supreme Court's approach as

a "slow strangulation of the rule." United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 561 (1975).
More recently, Justice Ginsburg opined that the exclusionary rule cannot survive if the
Court "leaves Herring, and others like him, with no remedy for violations of their
constitutional rights." Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 156 (2009) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting); see also Albert W. Alschuler, Herring v. United States: A Minnow or a
Shark?, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIg. L. 463, 463 (2009) (expressing concern that the current
Supreme Court "would leave most violations of the Fourth Amendment without a
remedy"); David A. Moran, The End of the ExclusionaryRule, Among Other Things: The
Roberts Court Takes on the FourthAmendment, 2005-2006 CATO Sup. CT. REv. 283, 284
(2006); Andrew E. Taslitz, Hypocrisy, Corruption, and Illegitimacy: Why Judicial
Integrity Justifies the ExclusionaryRule, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 419, 420 (2013) ("The
rule may thus be one vote away from dying, but its current life force is unquestionably on
the wane."). However, dire academic predictions must be measured against the opinion of
Justice Kennedy, who, nine years ago, assured us that the "continued operation of the
exclusionary rule, as settled and determined by our precedents, is not in doubt." Hudson
v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 603 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Thomas K. Clancy, The FourthAmendment's Exclusionary Rule as a
ConstitutionalRight,10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 357, 357 (2013) ("Both sides of the
exclusionary rule debate regarding whether it is a mere tool to enforce deterrence or
whether it is an individual rights based remedy have weighty authority and supporters.");
David Gray, A SpectacularNon-Sequitur: The Supreme Court's ContemporaryFourth
Amendment ExclusionaryRule Jurisprudence,50 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1, 2 (2013) (arguing
the Court should adopt a "hybrid theory of the exclusionary rule that embraces retributive
principles derived from the constitutional imperatives historically dominant in the Court's
exclusionary rule cases"); Taslitz, supra note 2, at 420-22.
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routinely disregard the Fourth Amendment and interfere with liberty
interests for no reason or based on racial or ethnic stereotypes and
profiles. 4 The data from New York also demonstrates that stop-and-frisks
rarely uncover contraband only 1.5% of 4.4 million people stopped over
the past decade were carrying weapons. 5 This new empirical evidence

'New York City announced on January 31, 2014 that it would settle its long-running
legal fight over N.Y.P.D. stop and frisk practices and implement many of the specific
reforms identified in Judge Scheindlin's decision. Mayor Bill de Blasio's announcement
was viewed as a dramatic reversal of the policies of the previous administration, which
had credited a drop in violent crime to the same stop-and-frisk practices. Benjamin
Weiser, Mayor Says New York City Will Settle Suits on Stop and Frisk Tactics, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 31, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/31/nyregion/de-blasio-stop-andfrisk.html; see also Joseph Goldstein, Judge Rejects New York's Stop and Frisk Policy,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/13/nyregion/stop-andfrisk-practice-violated-rights-judge-rules.html. For an essay exploring the possible effects
of Judge Scheindlin's decision, see Katherine Macfarlane, New York's Stop-and-Frisk
Appeals are Still Alive, BROOK. L. SCH. PRACTICUM (2013),
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2370556. Similar examples can be
found outside of New York. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE
NEWARK POLICE DEPARTMENT 4, 8 (2014), availableat
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nj/Press/files/pdffiles/2014/NPD /"2OFindings /"2OReport.pd
f (finding that New Jersey Police Department stops have routinely violated the Fourth
Amendment); AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, POLICE BRUTALITY AND SUPPRESSION OF
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS IN PUERTO RICO, available at https://www.aclu.org/policebrutality-and-suppression-first-amendment-rights-puerto-rico (finding the violation of
rights in Puerto Rico).
5 See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 558 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) ("52%
of all stops were followed by a protective frisk for weapons. A weapon was found after
1.5% of these frisks. In other words, in 98.5% of the 2.3 million frisks, no weapon was
found."), appealdismissed (Sept. 25, 2013); David Rudovsky & Lawrence Rosenthal,
The Constitutionalityof Stop-and-Frisk in New York City, 162 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE
117, 124 (2013); Robert Gearty & Corky Siemaszko, NYPD Stop-and-FriskPolicy
Yielded 4.4 Million Detentions but Few Results: Study, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 3, 2013,
http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nypd-stop-and-frisk-detains-millions-resutsarticle-i. 1307179 (discussing Professor Jeffrey Fagan's research revealing that only onetenth of 1%of New York City stop-and-frisks resulted in firearms confiscation from
2004 to June 30, 2012).
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suggests that our current conceptualization of the Fourth Amendment
encourages aggressive policing.6 When evidence is uncovered following
an illegal frisk or search, additional legal policy and social justice
questions arise. Answers to these questions should help shape the national
conversation on police tactics and inform state and federal criminal courts,
which routinely address Fourth Amendment issues.
As countless commentators have recognized, remedies are the life
force of rights. Constitutional rights questions are not ethereal concerns.

6 Jon B. Gould & Stephen Mastrofski, Suspect Searches: Assessing Police Behavior

Under the U.S. Constitution, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 315, 333 (2004); David A.
Harris, How Accountability-Based Policing Can Reinforce or Replace the Fourth
Amendment ExclusionaryRule, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 149, 154 (2013) (citing a 2004
study by Jon B. Gould and Stephen D. Mastrofski that involved an "investigation of
police adherence to search and seizure standards in the field, that is, in the course of
street-level police work.., using first-hand observation of police behavior not behavior
as reported to researchers after the fact or as recorded in court opinions to see what
police in situations presenting actual search and seizure issues really did ... [and]
concluded, Fourth Amendment violations, some quite egregious, showed up in almost a
third of all of the observed police investigations"); Tonja Jacobi, The Law and Economics
of the ExclusionaryRule, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 585, 611 (2011) (describing research
showing that "15% of police officers interviewed admitted they would intentionally
conduct an illegal search ... [which] probably understates underestimates the extent to
which police willfully violate the Fourth Amendment, since it is an admission against
interest"); Lawrence Rosenthal, Seven Theses in Grudging Defense of the Exclusionary
Rule, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIg. L. 525, 540 (2013) (citing studies involving "observation of
police officers on patrol that found that 46% of pat-down searches were
unconstitutional"); Taslitz, supra note 2, at 419-20 ("Empirical data and psychological
and economic theory establish ... [that] law enforcement violations of Fourth
Amendment protections are numerous, and the obstacles to alternative remedies so great
as to render them largely meaningless.").
7 For example, Taslitz has addressed the fundamental instrumental function of the
exclusionary rule, noting:
[T]he instrumental function of rights is to give their bearers access to
certain benefits to which society deems them entitled ....

[and] [i]n the

case of the Fourth Amendment, a defendant's desired instrumental
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Yet our traditional scholarly approach divorces practice from academic
inquiry by focusing significant attention on abstract doctrinal questions,
such as whether Weeks v. United Statesg created a sacrosanct rights-based
remedy or a malleable judicial rule. 9 This approach typically ignores the
operation of rights and remedies, which would also include problems of
evidentiary proof and persuasion, along with the myriad procedural
constraints. 10 Constitutional rights have no value without remedial
protection. Thus, it is a pointless academic exercise to opine on the scope
of the Fourth Amendment protections without a basic understanding of
how rights and remedies work. At a minimum, this should encompass: (1)
the filing and waiver of suppression motions; (2) the quantum of defense
proof; (3) realistic limits on defense access to both direct and
value is exclusion of evidence against him at trial, thus making it
harder, occasionally impossible, to convict him of a crime.
Taslitz, supra note 2, at 430-31.
8 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
9 See generally Clancy, supra note 3; Taslitz, supra note 2. Arguably this debate
should not have survived Justice Brennan's irrefutable logic in his dissenting opinion in
United States v. Leon:
The Court evades this principle by drawing an artificial line between
the constitutional rights and responsibilities that are engaged by actions
of the police and those that are engaged when a defendant appears
before the courts. According to the Court, the substantive protections of
the Fourth Amendment are wholly exhausted at the moment when
police unlawfully invade an individual's privacy and thus no
substantive force remains to those protections at the time of trial when
the government seeks to use evidence obtained by the police.
468 U.S. 897, 935 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
10 But see Morgan Cloud, A Conservative House United: How the Post-Warren
Court Dismantledthe ExclusionaryRule, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIV. L. 477, 499 (2013) (noting
that "when the Supreme Court engages in Fourth Amendment balancing, the collective
social interests asserted by the government almost always outweigh the defendant's
insular claims").
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circumstantial evidence of illegal police misconduct; (4) burden shifting
provisions; (5) recent blurring of historical distinctions between warrantauthorized and warrantless searches; (6) the rules governing judicial
discretion to grant suppression hearings enabling defendants to build a
record; (7) the case law constraining defense access to a suppression
hearing; and (8) the evolving standards of appellate review.

A. THE ROBERTS COURT CREATES A FAUX REASONABLE
POLICE OFFICER "GOOD FAITH" STANDARD

Defendants seeking exclusion have always struggled to prove that
police officers engaged in illegal conduct, " but, in 2009, Herring v.
United States 12 dramatically changed the scope and operation of the
exclusionary rule. After Herring, a defendant must first prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that a search was illegal. Once this burden
has been met, the defendant must further prove, using direct or
circumstantial evidence: (1) that the arresting officers acted deliberately,

" As early as three decades ago, Justice Brennan remarked that "[tlo the extent
empirical data is available regarding the general costs and benefits of the exclusionary
rule, it has shown... that the costs are not as substantial as critics have asserted[.]"
Leon, 468 U.S. at 942 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan's assertion was
supported with research demonstrating that, at the time, only approximately 0.2% of
federal prosecutions did not proceed based on evidence of an illegal search. See id. at
950.
12 555

U.S. 135 (2009).
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recklessly, or with gross negligence;" or, (2) that
the illegality was the
14
result of recurring or systemic police negligence.
Chief Justice Roberts, who wrote for the Herring majority, was
certainly aware that these new evidentiary obstacles would dramatically
expand prosecutors' access to illegally seized evidence. While the Herring
Court purported to rely on United States v. Leon, 15 which three decades
earlier had established an exclusion exception based on prosecution proof
of objective police officer "good faith," 16 Herring is not faithful to
precedent. Instead, as discussed below, the Roberts Court used Herringto
create a faux Leon "good faith" standard by (1) shifting the burden of
proof on police intent from the prosecution to the defendant thereby
making it a "bad faith" standard and (2) by ensuring that the type of
objective evidence available to defendants under Leon would no longer
suffice. This new exclusion standard is such a significant deviation from

13 Id. at

144 ("As laid out in our cases, the exclusionary rule serves to deter
deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or
systemic negligence."); Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2427 (2011) (quoting
Herring,555 U.S. at 144); see also Claire Angelique Nolasco, What HerringHas
Wrought: An Analysis ofPost-HerringCases in the FederalCourt, 38 AM. J. CRim. L.
221,222-23 (2011).
14In her Herringdissent, Justice Ginsburg emphasized the "gravity of recordkeeping

errors in law enforcement" and explained that recordkeeping errors "are susceptible to
deterrence by the exclusionary rle." Herring,555 U.S. at 150 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
However, the Court's suggestion that suppression could be obtained following proof of
"systematic error" is an empty promise because defendants lack the resources for this
type of discovery and, even if they did pursue discovery, police departments have no
incentive to maintain these types of records. See id.; see also Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427.
15 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
16 Leon,

468 U.S. at 922 (establishing an exception to the exclusionary rule based on

proof from the prosecution that a police officer acted in "objectively reasonable reliance"
on a "facially-valid search warrant").
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precedent that Justice
Breyer predicted that it "will swallow the
17
exclusionary rule."
Reaction to Herringhas been mixed. The case spawned a plethora
of academic commentary and piscine puns. 18 However, Herring has had
traction with a "law and order" public that abhors the exclusion of
incriminating evidence without much regard for how it was obtained 19 and
a Supreme Court majority with ongoing designs on the exclusionary
rule. 20 In 2011, in Davis v. United States, 21 the Court emphatically

17

See Davis, 131 S.Ct. at 2439 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[I]f the Court means what it

now says, if it would place determinative weight upon the culpability of an individual
officer's conduct, and if it would apply the exclusionary rule only where a Fourth
Amendment violation was 'deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent,' then the 'good
faith' exception will swallow the exclusionary rule.").
18 See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 2; Kenneth Earl, So Long and Thanks for All the
Herring: The U.S. ExclusionaryRule after Herringand What the United States Can
Learnfrom the CanadianExclusionaryRule, 31 WISC. INT'L L. J. 296 (2013); Wayne R.
LaFave, The Smell of Herring:A Critique of the Supreme Court's LatestAssault on the
ExclusionaryRule, 99 J. CRIM\. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 757 (2009); Jennifer E. Laurin,
TrawlingforHerring:Lessons in DoctrinalBorrowing and Convergence, 111 COLUM. L.
REV. 670 (2011).
19

See L. Timothy Perrin, et al., If It's Broken, Fix It: Moving Beyond the

ExclusionaryRule: A New and Extensive EmpiricalStudy of the ExclusionaryRule and a
Callfor a CivilAdministrative Remedy to PartiallyReplace the Rule, 83 IOWA L. REV.
669, 672 (1998). The public may be gravely mistaken about defendants' ability to
suppress illegally obtained evidence, but this does nothing to curb the view that the
exclusionary rule undermines police, prosecutors, and courts seeking to be tough on
crime. See Jacobi, supra note 6, at 629 (noting that the public inaccurately views "the
exclusionary rule.., as a means by which criminals get off on technicalities").
20 On October 7, 2014, the Supreme Court heard argument in Heien v. North
Carolina,a case involving whether an officer's mistaken view of the law can form the
basis for reasonable suspicion following a traffic stop and seizure of evidence. See
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Heien v. North Carolina, No. 13-604 (Nov. 13, 2013),
2013 WL 6091788.
21

Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2427, 2434 (2011).
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reaffirmed and expanded Herring.22 In Davis the Court clarified that
defense proof of illegal police conduct is necessary, but not sufficient, for
suppression. As Justice Alito explained for the Davis majority, the
exclusionary rule should not be applied if illegal police "conduct
involv[ed] only simple isolated negligence" 24 because under these
circumstances the "deterrence rationale loses much of its force and
exclusion cannot pay its way." 25 Given the obvious difficulty most
defendants will have proving a single instance of illegal police
misconduct, increasing the quantum of proof makes the evidentiary hurdle
nearly insurmountable.
Some commentators have inaccurately underestimated the Roberts
Court's role, positing instead that current limitations on exclusion date
back to Leon. 26 A majority of the Roberts Court clearly supports this
view, as evidenced by the seventeen separate citations to Leon that
appear in the majority opinion in Herring2 8 and the ten additional Leon

22

Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009).

Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427 (noting that "real deterrent value is a necessary condition
for exclusion, but it is not a sufficient one").
24
1d. at 2427-28.
23

25

[d.

26

See, e.g., John E. Taylor, Using Suppression Hearing Testimony to Prove Good

Faith Under United States v. Leon, 54 U. KAN. L. REv. 155, 165 (2005) ("[T]he Leon

good faith exception to the exclusionary rule might be more aptly termed the good-faith
'inclusionary rule' for warrant searches."); Donald Dripps, Living With Leon, 95 YALE
L.J. 906, 918 (1986) ("If an unconstitutional search confers on the victim a personal right
to suppression of its fruits, the balancing approach of Leon proceeds from an erroneous
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.").
27 See LaFave, supra note 18, at 78 ("[T]he Court would have us believe that Herring
matches up with these decisions, especially Leon.").
28 555 U.S. 135 (2009).

VirginiaJournalof CriminalLaw

[Vol. 3:89

citations in the majority opinion in Davis.2 9 However, recent empirical
evidence reveals that Leon has played a more limited role and, until
Herring,played no role in the vast majority of suppression cases because
most searches are warrantless. 30 The deliberate analytic jumbling of Leon
and Herring also obscures the impact of replacing Leon's objective (or
semi-objective) standard with the inevitably subjective standard of
Herringand Davis.
Leon involved a search pursuant to a warrant and prior to
Herring its effect was almost entirely limited to warrant-based
searches. 31 The specific question, according to the Leon Court, was
whether "the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be
charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the
Fourth Amendment. , 32 A reasonable officer, according to the Court, who
33
had read the warrant would have assumed it was "technically sufficient.",
Thus, the "good faith" exception created in Leon could only be established
based on review of the evidence available to both the executing officer and
the reviewing court. Specifically, the documentary evidence (i.e., the
warrant and supporting paperwork) proved notice and reasonable good
faith.
Herring and Davis ignore Leon's evidentiary contingency and
extend the requirement of an inference of police officer intent to all search
cases regardless of the available evidence. This shift has two critical
effects. First, it unrealistically increases the quantum of defense proof

29

See Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011).

30

See Robert C. Hauhart & Courtney C. Choi, The Good Faith Exception to the

ExclusionaryRule, 48 CRu\M. L. BULL. 316, 316-17 (2012) (conducting an extensive

study of 700 federal appellate cases applying Leon to conclude that the cases only
governed warrant-based searches).
31 See
32
33

generally id.

United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919-20 (1984).
_d.

at 921.
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necessary to support a judicial inference of police "bad faith" because
persuasive documentary evidence of police intent, like a facially invalid
warrant, is typically not available to defendants and is never available
following warrantless searches. Second, it changes the nature of defense
proof. When documentary evidence is not available, inferences about
"objective" good or bad faith are difficult or impossible. Instead,
defendants will be forced to prove that the "officers who conducted the
search . . . violate[d] . . . [the defendant's] Fourth
Amendment rights
34
negligence.,
gross
with
or
recklessly,
deliberately,

B. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AS A RULE OF EVIDENCE
1. A BRIEF HISTORY OF EXCLUSION
The exclusionary rule has been conceptualized as a constitutional
remedy, but it functions as a rule of evidence.3 5 By recalibrating the rules
of evidence governing suppression, the Roberts Court has effectively
erased a century of exclusion jurisprudence and ensured that most Fourth
Amendments violations will be irremediable.

" Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2428 (emphasis added); see also George M. Dery III, The
"BitterPill": The Supreme Court's Distastefor the ExclusionaryRule in Davis v. United
States Makes Evidence Suppression Impossible to Swallow, 23 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J.

1, 25 (2012) (contrasting Hortonv. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990), where the Court
found that evenhanded law enforcement is best achieved by the application of objective
standards or conduct); Kit Kinports, Culpability,Deterrence, and the ExclusionaryRule,

21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 821, 842 (2013) (noting that, after Herring,"proof of
reckless - and certainly deliberate - misconduct envisions a subjective inquiry into the
state of mind of the actual officer whose actions are in question").
15 See generally Arnold H Loewy, Police ObtainedEvidence and the Constitution:
DistinguishingUnconstitutionallyObtainedEvidence from Unconstitutionally Used
Evidence, 87 MICH. L. REv. 907 (1989) (making the general argument that Fourth

Amendment rights should be viewed as procedural rights because they are designed to
ensure the exclusion of evidence).
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The exclusionary rule, created in 1914 in Weeks v. United States,
initially governed only the federal courts.36 The problem of providing a
remedy for state police violations of constitutional rights was addressed
for the first time four decades later in the seminal case of Rochin v.
California,37 which established the due process "shocks the conscience"
standard. Rochin would govern remedial access following Fourth
Amendment violations for the next decade, until 1961, when Mapp v.
Ohio38 reduced the defendant's burden of proof in state courts to conform
to Weeks.
Over the past six decades, the Rochin "shocks the conscience"
standard has been derided for severely restricting access to exclusion. As
Justice Stevens opined in 1994 in Chavez v. Martinez,39 the requirement
that defendants proffer evidence that shocks the conscience does not work
because courts have refused to be shocked by a range of coercive and
illegal police procedures. 40 The Rochin standard is also inconsistent

36

See 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914).

37 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). As Justice Frankfurter famously opined:

This is conduct that shocks the conscience. Illegally breaking into the
privacy of the petitioner['s home], the struggle to open his mouth and
remove what was there, the forcible extraction of his stomach's
contents-this course of proceeding by agents of government to obtain
evidence is bound to offend even hardened sensibilities. They are
methods too close to the rack and the screw to permit of constitutional
differentiation.
Id. at 209-10.
3' 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
39 538 U.S. 760, 774-75 (1994) (finding that emergency room interrogation of a

suspect shot five times by police officer could not be characterized as "egregious" or
"conscience shocking").
4 -1d.at 787. In his concurring opinion, Justice
Stevens listed the following Supreme
Court cases:
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because, in a manner typical of "highly subjective substantive due process
methodologies,, 41 courts have required that defendants satisfy the nearinsurmountable evidentiary standard by proving that
police officers had
42
violated undefined "decencies of civilized conduct.,

Darwin v. Connecticut, 391 U.S. 346... (1968) (suspect interrogated

for 48 hours incommunicado while officers denied access to counsel);
Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35, 36... (1967) (officer fired rifle next
to suspect's ear and said 'If you don't tell the truth I am going to kill
you'); Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707... (1967) (suspect was arrested
without probable cause, interrogated for nine days with little food or
sleep, and gave three unwarned 'confessions' each of which he
immediately retracted); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 439-440... (1961)
(mentally retarded youth interrogated incommunicado for a week
'during which time he was frequently ill, fainted several times, vomited
blood on the floor of the police station and was twice taken to the
hospital ona stretcher'). Cagle v. State.... 221 So. 2d 119, 120 (1969)

(police interrogated wounded suspect at police station for one hour
before obtaining statement, took him to hospital to have his severe
wounds treated, only then giving the Miranda warnings; suspect
prefaced second statement with "'I have already give [sic] the Chief a
statement and I might as well give one to you, too"'), cert. denied... ;
People v. Saiz, 620 P.2d 15 (Colo. 1980) (two hours' unwarned
custodial interrogation of sixteen year-old in violation of state law
requiring parent's presence, culminating in visit to scene of crime);
People v. Bodner, 75 A.D.2d 440... (1980) (confrontation at police
station and at scene of crime between police and mentally retarded
youth with mental age of eight or nine); State v. Badger... 450 A.2d
336, 343 (1982) (unwarned 'close and intense' station house
questioning of 15-year-old, including threats and promises, resulted in
confession at 1:20 a.m.; court held '[w]arnings ... were insufficient to
cure such blatant abuse or compensate for the coercion in this case').
Id. at 787 n.I (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
41 Lewis v. Sacramento, 523 U.S. 833, 861 (Scalia, J., concurring).
42

Rochinv. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952). In a series of cases, the

Supreme Court denied exclusion because police misconduct failed to "shock the
conscience." See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985) (finding that forcing a suspect to
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This article posits that the Roberts Court has returned suppression
decisions to the shocks the conscience standard,4 3 but with a twist. In and
after Rochin, defendants who proffered evidence of shocking police
misconduct met the burden of proving illegality and the remedy inured
unless the prosecution proved specific facts that made exclusion
unwarranted (e.g., that the evidence derived from an independent source).
Professor Wayne LaFave has highlighted the importance of
suppression burden allocation and burden shifting, noting, "in the past
courts have consistently ruled that the government has the burden to prove
facts warranting application of the 'good faith' exception." 4 4 After
Herringand Davis, burden shifting to the prosecution has been eliminated.
The defense now bears the burden of proving illegality and (1) systemic
police negligence or (2) that the police officers acted knowingly,
submit to surgical intrusion for forensic testing purposes is unlikely to shock the
conscience if the societal interest is great and the physical medical risk is limited),
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966) (holding that it was permissible
for police, over defendant's objections, to have a doctor take a blood sample), and
Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 437 (1956) (explaining that "a blood test taken by a
skilled technician [does] not... 'shock[] the conscience'). For an interesting article
positing that the Supreme Court should incorporate a doctrine of human dignity into its
constitutional criminal procedure cases, see Michal Buchhandler-Raphael, Drugs,
Dignity, and Danger:Human Dignity as a ConstitutionalConstraintto Limit
Overcriminalization,80 TENN. L. REv. 291 (2010).
13 As shown below, the similarity between Herring,Davis, and the "shocks
the
conscience" substantive due process standard has attracted attention from some recent
lower courts and at least one other commentator. Although Clancy does not explore
pragmatic problems of proof of police culpability, his excellent analysis of the
constitutionality of the exclusionary remedy includes his observation that "[t]he new
culpability standard articulated in Herringand Davis has remarkable similarities to the
'shocks the conscience' standard that was briefly employed by the Court post- Wolf and
pre-Mapp in a few cases." Clancy, supra note 3, at 380. Along these same lines, Clancy
posits that recent qualified immunity cases from the Supreme Court will further erode
Fourth Amendment protections because, taken together with new exclusion cases, "what
will be considered egregious enough to justify exclusion will also be influenced, resulting
in increasingly diminished respect for the right to be secure over time." Id. at 383.
44 LaFave, supra note 18, at 786 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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recklessly, or with gross negligence. Defendants will rarely, if ever, have
access to direct evidence of police "bad faith" (e.g., a police officer's
statement acknowledging deliberate illegality or willful disregard of the
law). So illegally seized evidence will only be suppressed when a
defendant can prove circumstantially that police misconduct was so
patently egregious that
the defense evidence supports a judicial inference
45
faith.",
"bad
police
of
This study of the functional relationship between Fourth
Amendment rights and remedies differs from more traditional
constitutional analyses by: (1) highlighting pragmatic guidance from the
Court on the operation of the exclusionary rule; (2) clarifying the interplay
among evidentiary burdens, procedural constraints, burden shifting, and
remedial access; and, (3) erasing the false divide between doctrine and
practice.
2. PRAGMATIC GUIDANCE ON EXCLUSION FROM THE COURT
The Justices typically show little interest in the practice of law. On
the rare occasion when these questions arise, the Court's views on proof
and procedure can sometimes be surprisingly astute.
46
For example, in United States v. Leon, Justice White deplored the
adjudicatory problems and inconsistencies of a suppression standard that
involved "sending state and federal courts into the minds of police
officers. 4 7 In his view, requiring defendants to prove actual police officer
15 Davis

v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2437 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("The

Court's decision in Herringand again in Davis to 'place determinative weight upon the
culpability of an individual police officer's conduct' effects a 'change (which may
already be underway) that would affect not an exceedingly small set of cases, but a very
large number of cases, potentially many thousands each year."').
16 468

47

U.S. 897 (1984).

Id.at 922 n.23 ("[S]ending state and federal courts into the minds of police

officers would produce a grave and fruitless misallocation of judicial resources.").
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culpability "would produce a grave and fruitless misallocation of judicial
resources." 48 More recently, Justice Breyer opposed linking suppression to
a vague and unpredictable "case-by-case, multifactored inquiry into the
degree of police culpability." 4 Justice Ginsburg has similarly urged
adherence to the Court's longstanding "recognition that application of the
exclusionary rule does not require inquiry into the mental state of the
police.", 50 She has also outlined real-world proof problems, including the
fact that "the impecunious defendant" cannot possibly gather sufficient
evidence to establish systemic police negligence.
Justice Ginsburg's
predictions about the costs and effort of evidence gathering have been well
substantiated by Judge Scheindlin's recent assessment of stop-and-frisk
practices in New York and the massive quantity of supporting empirical
and statistical evidence cited therein.5 2
In analogous contexts, Justices have expressed nearly identical
concerns. In a case involving the suppression of a statement taken in
violation of Miranda, 3 Justice O'Connor predicted that requiring
defendants to prove police officer culpability would render the rule

48Id.

49Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 157, n.7 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting).

See id. Writing for the Herringmajority, Chief Justice Roberts dismissed Justice
Ginsburg's concerns by explaining "the pertinent analysis of deterrence and culpability is
objective, not an inquiry into the subjective awareness of arresting officers." Herring,
50

555 U.S. at 136. As discussed below, the Chief Justice's assertion finds little support in

logic or doctrine.
51Herring,555

U.S. at 157 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("[E]ven when deliberate or

reckless conduct is afoot, the Court's assurance will often be an empty promise: How is
an impecunious defendant to make the required showing? If the answer is that a
defendant is entitled to discovery (and if necessary, an audit of police databases).., then
the Court has imposed a considerable administrative burden on courts and law
enforcement.").
52

See Weiser, supra note 4.

53Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 626 (2004).
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inoperable because "[d]ifferent officers involved in an interrogation might
claim different states of mind regarding the failure to give Miranda
warnings [and] even in the simple case of a single officer who claims that
a failure to give Mirandawarnings was inadvertent, the likelihood of error
will be high." 54 More recently, in a case involving the suppression of
suggestive identification evidence, Justice Sotomayor complained that
"[b]y rendering protection contingent on improper police arrangement of
the suggestive circumstances,
the Court effectively grafts a mens rea
55
inquiry onto our rule.",
3.

THE QUANTUM AND BURDEN OF PROOF

Starting with Weeks in 1914 in the federal courts,56 and with Mapp
in 1961 in the state courts,57 defendants who proved that they had been
illegally searched could expect that any resulting evidence would be
suppressed. Before Leon, suppression was available in both the federal and
state courts unless the prosecutor proved that: (1) the evidence was not the
fruit of the illegal search (i.e., that the evidence had an independent source
or that any taint created by the illegal search had dissipated); or (2) the
evidence was seized under exigent circumstances. After Leon, evidence
seized pursuant to a facially valid warrant could be admitted, if the
prosecutor proved that an objectively reasonable police officer who read
the warrant would not have noticed the constitutional defect. 58 Although

54

[d.

55 Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 731 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
56

Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398-99 (1914).

57 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961).
51 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919-20 (1984).
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the Leon "good faith" exception provided prosecutors with a new tool to
avoid exclusion, its effects were limited.5 9
4.

PROVING BAD FAITH

All police searches are intentional because, when police officers
search for evidence, they invariably have the purpose of achieving a
specific result (i.e., uncovering evidence). To the extent that a lucky
investigating officer may stumble upon incriminating evidence, that
discovery is by definition not a search. Thus, after Herring and Davis,
instead defendants must now prove that the Fourth Amendment violation
was intentional, reckless, or grossly negligent (the defendant cannot
simply prove that the search was intentional). As noted above, requiring
that defendants prove that illegal police conduct was motivated by "bad
faith" police intent creates near-insurmountable proof problems that can
only be overcome with the type of evidence that shocks a judge's
conscience.6 0

'9 LaFave has also highlighted the importance of burden-shifting in the exclusionary
rule context, noting that "in the past courts have consistently ruled that the government
has the burden to prove facts warranting application of the good faith exception."
LaFave, supra note 18, at 786 (citations omitted).
60

See, e.g., 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 203 (2014); JE. on Behalf of G.E. v. State, Dep't

of Human Servs., Div. of Developmental Disabilities, 131 N.J. 552, 569 (1993) ("We

generally have imposed the burdens of persuasion and production on the party best able
to satisfy those burdens."); United States v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 776 F.2d 962, 964 (11th Cir.
1985) ("[We adhere] to the common law guide that the party in the best position to
present the requisite evidence should bear the burden of proof'); Ray v. Clements, 700
F.3d 993, 1008 (7th Cir. 2012) cert. denied, 133 S.Ct. 2768 (U.S. 2013).
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C. LEGAL PRAGMATISM

Exclusion is the principal function of all rules of evidence. 6 1 Thus,
an evidence-based approach to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has
antecedents in prior scholarly efforts to explore the interplay between
substantive and procedural rights.62 This approach is also closely aligned
with aspects of legal pragmatism 6 3 because it focuses on the function and
operation of the exclusionary rule, which is treated principally as a
pragmatic question. 64 Richard A. Posner, perhaps the most fervent
contemporary proponent of legal pragmatism, once explained that
pragmatism is "not just a fancy term for ad hoc adjudication; it involves
consideration of systemic and not just case-specific consequences. , 65 A
disquisition on legal pragmatism is beyond the scope of this article. It
61See

Robert P. Burns, The WitheringAway ofEvidence: Notes on Theory and

Practice,47 GA. L. REV. 691, 695 (identifying four normative sources for evidence
exclusion: (1) "a paternalistic judgment regarding the supposed limitations of jurors to
assign evidence its appropriate weight;" (2) "a political-philosophical judgment about the
nature of the rule of law and the place of the jury in determining the law;" (3) "pragmatic
concessions to the shortness of life;" and, (4) "a 'policy goal' distinct from and
sometimes in derogation of the purpose of the trial-ascertaining the truth and securing a
just determination").
62 See, e.g., Loewy, supra note 35, at 910 ("Therefore, the Court was correct in
holding the exclusionary rule to be simply a remedial device designed to make the
substantive right more meaningful rather than an independent procedural right.").
63Michael Rosenfeld, Pragmatism,Pluralismand Legal Interpretation:Posner's
and Rorty's Justice Without MetaphysicsMeets Hate Speech, 18 CARDozo L. REV. 97, 99
(1996) (noting that "pragmatism, which originated in the United States, and which counts
the nineteenth-century American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce as its first major
proponent, has been the dominant philosophy in the United States ever since").
6' RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 47 (2003); see also

Rosenfeld, supra note 63, at 100 ("The deterrent efficacy of the exclusionary rule is
ultimately an empirical and not theoretical question, but the available empirical evidence
is anything but clear.").
65 POSNER, supra note 64, at 47.
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might also be ill advised given Professor Susan Haack's astute observation
that pragmatism has already generated "a desperately confusing scholarly
mare's nest. , 66 But one need not embrace legal pragmatism to recognize
that traditional constitutional inquiry would benefit from greater
"skeptic[ism] of any philosophy of adjudication that casts the judge in the
role of a quester after certainty who employs to that end tools as close to
67
formal logic as possible.,

Many academic observers do reject formal logic claims, but these
same commentators often inexplicitly accept the Justices' stated pragmatic
objectives, which, in the exclusion context, focus on police deterrence. 68
Blind obeisance to the Court's overt goals limit the scope and breadth of
academic critique. Some scholars who accept the Justices at their word

66

Susan Haack, On Legal Pragmatism: Where Does the "Pathof the Law" Lead

Us?, 50 AM. J. JURIS. 71, 74 (2005).
67 POSNER, supra note 64, at 47; see also Rosenfield, supra note 63, at 100 (noting
that "[b]y shifting the focus from foundations to results, pragmatism invites all members
of a pluralist society to turn away from their disputes concerning conceptions of the good
in order to join in the common pursuit of practical results").
68 See Cloud, supra note 10, at 479 ("Justices holding diverse political views,

including competing views about the suppression of evidence, appear to accept without
question jurisprudential doctrines essential to the diminishment of the exclusionary
remedy."); Kinports, supra note 34, at 822 ("Although it is well accepted that the Court
now treats the exclusionary remedy as exclusively deterrence-driven, the Court has not
articulated a coherent theory explaining how it expects exclusion to deter unconstitutional
searches and why it considers deterrence a worthy goal."); LaFave, supra note 18, at 787
("It is not shown that unconstitutional searches and seizures brought about by negligence
are either less in need or less capable of deterrence."); Christopher Slobogin, The
ExclusionaryRule is on its Way Out? Should it be?, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 341, 349
(2013) (proposing that because "[t]he exclusionary rule is not very effective at curbing
police misconduct ....

meaningful deterrence of illegality could be better achieved

through damages regime holding miscreant police personally liable without
indemnification at a liquidated rate when they act in bad faith, and holding the
department liable at the same rate when the police violation is negligent").
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have questioned whether exclusion is an effective deterrent,69 while others
have commented on the lack of or impossibility of empirical support. 70 It
69

See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 153 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)

(noting that the majority's assumption that police officers are the only participants in the
criminal justice system who can be effectively deterred through imposition of the
exclusionary rule "runs counter to a foundational premise of tort law-liability for
negligence, i.e., lack of due care, creates an incentive to act with greater care"); see also
Kinports, supra note 34, at 821 ("Academics and jurists of all stripes agree that the
Court's case law in this area is a mess."); Nolasco, supra note 13, at 223-24 ("[T]he
Herringdecision has weakened the exclusionary rule [and] disregarded the rationale
behind the good-faith doctrine."); Slobogin, supra note 68, at 341 ("Since 1974, when
United States v. Calandradefinitively established deterrence as the primary objective of
the suppression remedy, the Court has nibbled away at the exclusionary rule from a
number of different directions.").
It is also hard not to agree with Professor Donald Dripps that "individual officers do
not internalize either the benefits or costs of Fourth Amendment activity." Donald A.
Dripps, The "New " Exclusionary Rule Debate: From "Still Preoccupiedwith 1985" to
"Virtual Deterrence" 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 743, 763 (2010), or with Albert Alschuler's
astute critique:
The Court's [Herring] analysis rested on an oversimplified view of
how the exclusionary rule achieves its instrumental goals. On the one
hand, the Court insulted a second occupational group by indicating that
court employees do not care whether their mistakes and deliberate
wrongs cause the dismissal of otherwise well-founded criminal charges.
On the other hand, the Court assumed that the exclusionary rule
influences the police only by frustrating their distinctive lust for
punishment.
Alschuler, supra note 2, at 469. Thus, genuine efforts to establish a more empirically
sound basis for these assumptions are worth recognizing. Jacobi describes a formal model
that explains:
[T]he exclusionary rule can deter some searches, [but] it will not do so
under typical conditions... [and] only works as the Court claims under
very unusual circumstances, requiring police to place very little value
on getting drugs or weapons off the street; furthermore, the police may
still have a dominant strategy to search under other conditions, even if
exclusion of evidence is guaranteed.
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is possible, but not especially likely, that Justice Ginsburg may garner
greater support for her complaint that a micro-focus on police deterrence
disrespects the constitutional majesty of the exclusionary rule. 71 But
because deterrence has been fully addressed by the Court and countless
commentators, this article takes a different approach. Deterrence may be a
plausible pragmatic goal, but it is also a red herring concealing other
unspoken objectives.
Herring and Davis are constructed to avoid skeptical scrutiny of
non-deterrence objectives.7 2 In fact, both decisions engage in the type of

Jacobi, supra note 6, at 588
7' Kinports, supra note 34, at 856 ("Until the Court is willing to treat the
exclusionary rule like other remedies and balance the deterrent function with additional
priorities, it is left to fashion an exclusionary remedy relying exclusively on the
empirically unanswerable questions surrounding deterrence."); Jerry E. Norton, The
ExclusionaryRule Reconsidered: Restoring the Status Quo Ante, 33 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 261, 272 (1998) (" [A] perpetual problem with the deterrence justification is that it is
not capable of exacting empirical proof, whether the subject is a police officer or a
burglar ....[for example,] [i]f one were to study the deterrence justification by
interviewing convicted burglars, one would conclude that the threat of punishment does
not deter at all."); see also Alfredo Garcia, Toward an Integrated Vision of Criminal
ProceduralRights: A Counter to Judicialand Academic Nihilism, 77 MARQ. L. REv. 1,
16 (1993) ("[T]he defense of exclusion on the basis of its deterrent effect suffers from
similar logical and empirical flaws.").
71 Herring,555 U.S. at 154 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quotations omitted) (stating
that she shares a "more majestic conception of the Fourth Amendment and its adjunct, the
exclusionary rule"); see also United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 460 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]he exclusionary rule is a necessary and inherent constitutional ingredient
of the Fourth Amendment."). But see Clancy, supra note 3, at 377 ("If Justice Ginsburg
truly believed in a more majestic conception of the rule, she did not apply that concept in
Herring....She gave us no vision and no guides.").
72 See Davis v. United States, 131 S.Ct. 2419, 2426 (2011) ("The rule's sole
purpose, we have repeatedly held, is to deter future Forth Amendment violations.");
Herring,555 U.S. at 141 ("We have repeatedly rejected the argument that exclusion is a
necessary consequence of a Fourth Amendment violation ....[i]nstead we have focused
on the efficacy of the rule in deterring Fourth Amendment violations in the future."); see
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jurisprudential opacity that Justice Scalia has (in other contexts)
disparaged as "faux judicial restraint as judicial obfuscation., 73 As noted
above, while purporting to apply Leon (a case involving search warrants),
the Roberts Court has begun blocking remedial access after warrantless
searches by expanding the quantum of proof (proof of illegality is now
insufficient), changing the standard from good to bad faith, and shifting
the burden of proof on police intent from the prosecution to the defendant.
As the current Chief Justice approaches his second decade on the Court,
"the charge of faux judicial restraint has become something of a familiar
theme in criticisms from both the right and left of Justice Roberts's
characterization of precedents., 74 It is an especially apt criticism in the
exclusion context.

also Clancy, supra note 3, at 367-68 ("As to the purpose of the rule, the view that the
rule is designed to deter future police misconduct has evolved to be the rule's sole
purpose."); Eugene Milhizer, The ExclusionaryRule Lottery Revisited, 59 CATH.U. L.
REV. 747, 749 (2010) ("According to the Court, the contemporary reductionist Fourth

Amendment exclusionary rule is a judicially created mechanism, designed with the sole
purpose of deterring future police misconduct by excluding from trial evidence obtained
through unconstitutional searches and seizures.").
73FEC v. Wisc. Right to Life, Inc., 551

U.S. 449, 498-99 (2007) (Scalia, J.,

concurring). The decision might also be viewed as emblematic of how, according to
Professor Laurence Tribe, "the Chief Justice talks the talk of moderation while walking
the walk of extreme conservatism." See Jeffrey Toobin, No More Mr. Nice Guy, NEW
YORKER, May 25, 2009,

http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/05/25/090525fa fact toobin?currentPage=6;
see also LaFave, supra note 18, at 759 ("The holding in Herringfinds little support in the

Chief Justice's opinion for the majority, which perhaps accurately reflects his apparent
longstanding opposition to the exclusionary rule, but is totally unconvincing and in many
respects irrelevant and disingenuous.").
71Jeffrey Rosen, Originalism,Precedent,and JudicialRestraint, 34 HARv. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y

129, 133 (2011).
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D. THE ROADMAP

This article diverges from traditional Fourth Amendment inquiries
by focusing on how problems of proof define rights and remedies. The
article integrates constitutional theory and criminal practice as a direct
response to Judge Posner's complaint that scholars have "an insufficiently
aggressive conception of the judicial role in enforcing constitutional
rights. 7 5
This article contains five sections. It begins with a brief
exploration of how the Roberts Court has transformed the operation of the
exclusionary rule. The second section places the exclusionary rule in
context by incorporating analyses of the substantive and procedural
constraints on the operation of the constitutional standard (which are
invariably omitted from scholarly analyses), including: (1) federal and
state criminal procedure rules; (2) the nature and weight of defense
evidence typically available following warrant-authorized and warrantless
searches; (3) judicial discretion to grant or refuse a pretrial evidentiary
hearing; (4) burden allocation and shifting on the element of police intent;
and, (5) appellate review. The third section examines Supreme Court

75Richard A. Posner, LegalPragmatismDefended, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 683, 686

(2004). Some commentators believe that Herring suggests that Chief Justice Roberts may
share Judge Posner's famous distaste for a "highfalutin rhetoric of absolutes" and prefer
that the Court base action on facts and consequences rather than on "conceptualisms,
generalities, pieties, and slogans." Bradford C. Mank, Judge Posner 's "Practical"
Theory of Standing: Closer to Justice Breyer'sApproach to Standing then to Justice

Scalia 's, 50 Hous. L. REV. 71, 103 (2012) (quoting RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY

227 (1999)); see also Rosenfeld, supra

note 63, at 100 ("Thus, under pragmatism, justice according to law would depend neither
on particular conceptions of the good, nor on finding an Archimedean point between
these conceptions, nor on systematically severing law from other normative or social
endeavors. Instead, justice according to law would be measured by its practical
consequences, by the actual results to which it leads.").
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decisions addressing relevant problems of proof and procedure.76 The
fourth section disaggregates the Roberts Court's stare decisis claims. The
fifth section explores new cases illustrating the recent impact of Herring
and Davis. In conclusion, the article posits that the Court has covertly
returned suppression to a "shocks the conscience" standard.
I. THE ROBERTS COURT TRANSFORMS THE OPERATION OF THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE
A. HERRING V. UNITED STATES
1. THE FACTS

Shortly after Herring was decided in 2009, Professor LaFave
described it as "not simply wrong, it is wrong over and over again!", 77 The
facts of Herring are a simple (if cautionary) tale. On July 7, 2004, Mr.
Bennie Dean Herring, whom Chief Justice Roberts colorfully described as
"no stranger to law enforcement,, 78 made the strategic mistake of entering
the Coffee County Sheriffs Department parking lot to retrieve the
methamphetamine and gun (which as a felon he could not lawfully
possess) he had left in the cab of his impounded truck. Investigator Mark
Anderson spotted Mr. Herring because he was apparently "known to the
sheriff s department" and requested a computerized warrant check. 79 After

76

"In the usual scenario, the process starts with the defendant seeking to invoke the

exclusionary rule through his or her motion to suppress... Once the defendant is able to
convince the court by the preponderance of the evidence that his or her privacy rights
were violated, it becomes the state's responsibility to raise the good faith exception."
Hauhart & Choi, supra note 30, at 324.
77 LaFave, supra note 18, at 758.
7' Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 137 (2009).
79 The story of their acquaintance may be more complicated. Mr. Herring had

apparently "told the District Attorney, among others, of his suspicion that Anderson had
been involved in the killing of a local teenager, and Anderson had pursued Herring to get
him to drop the accusations." Herring,555 U.S. at 149 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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no warrants were uncovered in Coffee County, Investigator Anderson
requested a database search for neighboring Dale County, and the search
revealed an outstanding warrant. 8°
Investigator Anderson followed Herring from the impound lot,
arrested him on the Dale County warrant, and uncovered the gun and
drugs during a search incident to arrest. 8 1 Almost immediately afterwards,
the inspector was notified that the warrant had been recalled five months
earlier. However, when Herring moved pretrial to suppress the illegally
82
seized physical evidence, the trial court rejected the defendant's motion.
In the trial court's opinion, Investigator Anderson had acted in "good
faith" based on erroneous information provided by sheriffs department
personnel. 83 The Eleventh Circuit agreed, holding that the illegal
warrantless search fell within the reasonable police "good faith" exception
established to cover the execution of a facially valid warrant in United

States v. Leon. 84

Although no further details appear in the case, in April 2000, Investigator Anderson was
investigated, but not indicted, after he engaged in a high-speed chase with a sixteen yearold girl who failed to stop when he tried to pull her over for a traffic violation. It is
possible that Mr. Herring was referring to this incident. See Deputy Not Indicted in
Connection with Traffic Death of Zion Chapel High School Student, SE. SUN ALA., Oct.

18, 2000, www.southeastsun.com/home/article 57838e'f-2b1-588a-98426c44a47b53c3.html.
" Herring,555 U.S. at 137.
81

Id.

82

See United States v. Herring, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1293 (M.D. Ala. 2005), aff'd,

492 F.3d 1212 (llth Cir. 2007), aff'd, 555 U.S. 135 (2009).
83

Id. at 1292.

84

See United States v. Herring, 492 F.3d 1212, 1218 (11th Cir. 2007), aff'd, 555

U.S. 135 (2009) (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)).
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2. THE EVIDENCE
The Herring Court began with the assumption that the
exclusionary rule is both limited and malleable. According to the Court,
notwithstanding defense proof establishing (1) an illegal search and (2)
that prosecution evidence was obtained as a direct result of that illegal
search, "suppression is not an automatic consequence. 8 5
According to the Herring Court, defendants seeking to suppress
illegally obtained evidence can attempt to prove that the illegal search or
seizure was attributable to "recurring or systemic negligence" 8 6 by the
police. However, there are obvious and manifold impediments to defense
acquisition of proof establishing that an officer or police department (the
Herring Court fails to specify which) engaged in regular systemic
negligence. According to the four Herring dissenters, "impecunious
defendants" can never engage in the necessary "audit of police
databases" 87 that could reveal system-wide patterns of behavior.
Moreover, the Court naively assumes that such records always exist. Even
in the unlikely event that police departments create and retain accurate
records memorializing routine officer negligence (not merely records
detailing disciplinary proceedings), a review of such records "impose[s] a
considerable burden on courts and law enforcement."8 8
The HerringCourt's decision that non-systemic police negligence
should not result in suppression is both unduly burdensome as an
evidentiary matter and unprecedented. During a century of federal
exclusion cases and a half-century of state cases, in every court until

15Herring,555

U.S. at 137.

8

6Id.at 144. The HerringCourt notably failed to clarify whether the evidentiary

burden on the defendant is to establish repeated negligence by this officer, systemic
negligence by this police department, or perhaps both.
87
Id. at 157.
88 -d.
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Herring, suppression was available in cases involving isolated police
misconduct. The creation of the new rule depends on selective and
misleading citations to United States v. Leon that omit critical
contradictory language.
For example, according to the Herring Court, "because the error
was merely negligent," the evidence seized from Bennie Dean Herring
was "admissible under the good-faith rule of United States v. Leon." 89
However, writing for the Leon majority, Justice White specifically found
that illegally obtained evidence should be suppressed whenever "the
police have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct...
depriv[ing] the defendant of some right." 90 Throughout the decision, the
Leon Court clearly referred to the single "act," i.e., the illegal search at
issue, and never mentioned proof of systemic departmental negligence or a
pattern of prior illegal police officer conduct. Leon further clarified the
defendant's evidentiary burden by stating that suppression is justified
because "courts hope to instill in those particular investigating officers...
a greater degree of care toward the rights of an accused." 91 Unlike
Herring,Leon clearly contemplated exclusion based on proof of ordinary
negligence ("degree of care") and isolated illegality (by "those particular
investigation officers").

89 Id.

9' United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919 (1984); see also Kinports, supra note 34,

at 841-42 (noting that although "the Herringmajority claimed that an officer's
'knowledge and experience' can be taken into account as one of the relevant
'circumstances' in applying an objectively reasonable person test without converting the
standard into a subjective one... that is a negligence standard and not one of the higher
levels of culpability required by Herring").
9' Leon, 468 U.S. at 919.
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B. DAVIS V. UNITED STATES
1. THE FACTS
In June 2011, the Supreme Court decided Davis v. United States.
An evidence-based analysis of Davis must begin with the threshold
question of why the Court even granted certiorari in this case. Davis arose
following a 2007 traffic stop that resulted in an arrest and a search incident
to the arrest of the passenger compartment of the suspect's car, which
uncovered a handgun. 92 At the time, the search was authorized under
binding Supreme Court precedent because the Eleventh Circuit had "long
read New York v. Belton to establish a bright-line rule authorizing
substantially contemporaneous vehicle searches incident to arrest."93 In his
suppression motion, Davis argued that the search was illegal because the
Supreme Court overruled Belton in 2009 while his appeal was pending.
Thus, the question of retroactivity should have been determinative to both
the Eleventh Circuit 94 and the Supreme Court.
An inquiry into police officer good/bad faith was not before the
Davis Court. In fact, the Eleventh Circuit had easily recognized that any
police officer's "[r]elying on a court of appeals' well-settled and
unequivocal precedent is analogous to relying on a statute." 95 Justice
Alito, who wrote for the Davis majority, reached the same conclusion by
citing Illinois v. Krull, 96 arguing that "penalizing the officer for the
legislature's error cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth
Amendment violations, [so] [t]he same should be true of Davis's attempt

92

Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2426 (2011).

93

1d. (citing New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1980)).

9' United States v. Davis, 598 F.3d 1259, 1264 (1 1th Cir. 2010), aff'd, 131 S. Ct.
2419, 2426 (2011).
95

1d. at 1267.

96 480 U.S. 340 (1987) (extending the Leon reasonable good-faith exception to

searches conducted in reasonable reliance on subsequently invalidated state statutes).
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here to penalize the officer for the appellate judge's error." 97 Justice
Sotomayor made a similar observation in her concurrence, explaining,
"this case does not present the markedly different question of whether the
exclusionary rule applies when the law governing the constitutionality of a
particular search is unsettled." 98 Prior to Davis, Krull was not the rule in
every appellate court. 99 But because the Davis Court unnecessarily entered
the sticky morass of police officer intent, aligning the circuits on the minor
distinction between binding law and binding Supreme Court precedent
was probably not the real objective.
2. THE EVIDENCE
Justice Alito began his review of the evidence by noting the
obvious: the Fourth Amendment "says nothing about suppressing
evidence." 10 0 Then without explanation, he explicitly rejected the Court's
previous "expansive dicta .. suggest[ing] that the [exclusionary] rule was
a self-executing mandate implicit in the Fourth Amendment itself." 1° 1 In
the Davis Court's view, the Court had "abandoned the old reflexive
application of the doctrine, and imposed a more rigorous weighing of its
costs and benefits." 102 According to the majority, exclusion is "not a
personal constitutional right," 10 3 but a rule created solely as "a deterrence
sanction that bars the prosecution from introducing evidence obtained by

97Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2429.
98

d. at 2435 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).

99 Davis, 598 F.3d at 1266 (noting that circuits vary on whether exclusionary rule
should apply when police have relied on clear, well-settled judicial precedent).
100Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427.

101 Id.
102 Td.

10 3 Id. at 2426.
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way of a Fourth Amendment violation." 104 The disaggregation of the
remedy from the right echoes Herring and a handful of more tentative
steps in the same direction. 105 However, Davis more specifically addressed
the burden of proof, holding that a finding that suppression has "real
deterrent value is a necessary condition for exclusion, but it is not a
sufficient one." 10 6 Consistent with Herring, the burden of proving police
intent would no longer shift to the prosecutor
upon proof of police
107
illegality but would remain with the defendant.
Finally, Justice Alito opined that judges must carefully weigh

suppression's "high costs[s] to both truth and public safety." 10 8 But he put
a finger on the scale, because the Davis Court instructs judges to presume
that suppression "almost always requires courts to ignore reliable,
104
105

1d. at 2423.
1d at 2427-28 (citing as examples Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006),

Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995), and United States v. Calandra,414 U.S. 338
(1974)).
116 Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427. Although the Davis Court quotes selectively here from

Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 596 (2006), that citation repeats a significant
misreading of United States v. Calandra,414 U.S. 338 (1974) (its sole source). Despite
subsequent reliance by both the Hudson and Davis Courts, the CalandraCourt did not
hold that the defense-proffered evidence, sufficient to support a finding of real deterrent
value, did not warrant exclusion. Instead, the CalandraCourt was making the entirely
distinct point that "it does not follow that the Fourth Amendment requires adoption of
every proposal that might deter police misconduct." Calandra,414 U.S. at 350.
Moreover, the Hudson Court had not relied on Calandrato support an analysis of real
deterrence, but to bolster that Court's view that, based on the facts at issue, deterring
violations of the "Knock and Announce" rule rather than the Fourth Amendment would
"achieve absolutely nothing except the prevention of destruction of evidence and the
avoidance of life-threatening resistance by occupants of the premises." Hudson, 547 U.S.
at 596. Given these facts, it is misleading for Justice Alito to suggest that, in Hudson and
Calandra,the Court concluded a finding of actual deterrent value could not justify the
suppression of illegally seized evidence.
117

Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2423.

108

Id.
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trustworthy evidence bearing on guilt or innocence." 10 9 The exclusionary
rule is a "bitter pill" 110 swallowed only when the defendant has proved that
"the police exhibit[ed] 'deliberate,' 'reckless,' or 'grossly negligent'
disregard for Fourth Amendment rights" " because the remedy
"suppress[es] the truth and set[s] the criminal loose in the community
without punishment." 112 Given the facts of Davis, Justice Alito's emphatic
endorsement of the new Herring standard was wholly this entire
discussion was unnecessary to resolution of the case.
II. OPERATION OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN THE FEDERAL AND
STATE COURTS

The nature and scope of rights are defined pragmatically by access
to remedial protection. Thus any useful examination of how Fourth
Amendment rights work must include: (1) the rules governing filing and
waiver of suppression motions; (2) the quantum of defense proof, (3) realworld limits on defendants' access to persuasive direct and circumstantial
evidence; (4) burden shifting provisions; (5) the blurring of historical
distinctions between warrant-authorized and warrantless searches; (6) the
rules defining judicial discretion to grant suppression hearings; (7) the
case law constraining defense access to a suppression hearing and limiting
defendants' ability to build a record; and (8) the standards of appellate
review.

109

Id. at 2427.

110

1d.

111 1d.
112 Td.
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A. FILING THE SUPPRESSION MOTION
The mechanics of suppression in the federal courts are governed by
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and similar rules operate in the
state courts. For example, as a threshold matter, under Rule 12(b) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 113 and its state counterparts, the
motion to suppress must be made pretrial. Rule 12(e)l 14 further provides
that the defendant who fails to file a suppression motion pretrial is deemed
to have waived his constitutional objections unless he can provide
adequate reasons for the delay.
When defendants seek to exclude evidence seized during a
warrant-authorized search, federal and state courts require proof by a
preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the warrant was unsupported by
probable cause; 115 (2) the warrant was facially invalid; 1 16 or, (3) that the
evidence discovered during the search exceeded the scope of the warrant
authorization.1 1 7 In contrast, when defendants seek to suppress evidence
illegally seized during a warrantless search, federal and state courts
require proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's

113
FED. R. CRvIM. P. 12(b)(3)(C).
114 FED.

R. CRIv. P. 12(e) ("Waiver of a Defense, Objection, or Request. A party

waives any Rule 12(b)(3) defense, objection, or request not raised by the deadline the
court sets under Rule 12(c) or by any extension the court provides. For good cause, the
court may grant relief from the waiver.").
115 See, e.g., Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 423 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas,
378 U.S. 108, 121 (1964).
116 See, e.g., Grohv. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 558 (2004).
117
See, e.g., Hortonv. California, 496 U.S. 128, 142 (1990) ("[I]tems seized from
petitioner's home [must be] discovered during a lawful search authorized by a valid
warrant" unless they are found in "plain view"); United States v. Jackson, 120 F.3d 1226,
1228 (11th Cir. 1997) ("If a search exceeds the scope of terms of a warrant, any
subsequent seizure is unconstitutional.").
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Fourth Amendment rights were violated by an "unreasonable" search or
seizure.118
B. PRAGMATIC LIMITS ON DEFENSE EVIDENCE
Motions to suppress illegally seized evidence are typically
supported by affidavits based on the personal knowledge and observations
of the defendant or (less commonly) the additional personal knowledge
and observations of a defense witness. 119 As one court recently held, "the
defendant, in moving for a suppression hearing, must include an affidavit
of someone alleging personal knowledge of the relevant fact, and that fact
must put the issue
of the legality of the warrantless .
0
12

.

. [police act] into

contention."
Although precise data regarding warrantless searches is nearly
impossible to find, it is a common and reasonable assumption that most
searches are warrantless. Warrantless searches only infrequently result in
published judicial opinions, and the documentary evidence following a
warrantless search is normally limited to police reports and chain of
custody records for seized evidence. Suppression motions in these cases
typically rely on personal affidavits filed by the defendant recounting the
alleged police misconduct. 121 In many cases, this will be the only evidence

118

See Groh, 540 U.S. at 559 (noting that warrantless searches must be reasonable

and that "searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively
unreasonable").
119 United States v. Lonzo, 793 F. Supp. 57, 58-59 (N.D.N.Y. 1992).
120

United States v. Marquez, 367 F. Supp. 2d 600, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).

121 See,

e.g., People v. Patterson, 735 N.E.2d 616, 627 (Ill. 2000) (demonstrating how

defendant attached affidavit with his own personal allegations of police misconduct as
well as the affidavits of two others to support a suppression motion); Com. v.
Santosuosso, 501 N.E.2d 1186, 1189 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986); State v. Ofenham, 260 P.3d

722, 725 (Or. Ct. App. 2011) (defendant replies that his present argument is encompassed
in the post-conviction judgment because an argument that defendant was not properly
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establishing the Fourth Amendment violation, 122 regardless of whether the
defendant has alleged: (1) that he did not consent to the warrantless
search; (2) that evidence was not found in plain view; (3) that there were
no exigent circumstances; or, (4) that the police seizure and/or search
exceeded the scope of a Terry stop-and-frisk.
Defendants seeking exclusion based on other analogous
constitutional arguments have greater access to relevant and persuasive
evidence. For example, a defendant seeking to exclude his own statement
based on a Mirandaviolation normally has had the opportunity to review
Miranda waiver forms, written statements by the police or the defendant,
police reports, and in some jurisdictions, video or audiotapes of the
warnings, waiver, and interrogation. 123 Defendants can aggregate this
evidence to establish critical facts for the reviewing court, including: the
timing of the arrest; the duration of custody; the inadequacy of warnings;
the lack of a knowing and intelligent waiver; effective invocation of the
right to silence and/or the right to counsel; or, any other police
advised of his rights is a claim of "police misconduct" and because the judgment waives
the requirement of preservation); State v. Raflik, 636 N.W.2d 690, 702 (Wis. 2001)
(appealing denial of Motion to Suppress, and seeking to use affiant's affidavit for
support).
122 See United States v. Holland, 522 F. App'x 265, 270 n.2 (6th Cir. 2013) (noting
that, during a suppression hearing based on defendants' argument that they had not
consented to the search, the trial judge emphasized the defendants' right "to put on
testimony that you believe would be in conflict with the testimony that the Court has
heard from the officers and from the FBI agent ... because you have an absolute right to
testify in your suppression hearings").
123See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975) ("The question whether a
confession is the product of a free will.., must be answered on the facts of each case. No
single fact is dispositive. The workings of the human mind are too complex, and the
possibilities of misconduct too diverse, to permit protection of the Fourth Amendment to
turn on such a talismanic test. The Miranda warnings are an important factor, to be sure,
in determining whether the confession is obtained by exploitation of an illegal arrest. But
they are not the only factor to be considered. The temporal proximity of the arrest and the
confession, the presence of intervening circumstances.... and, particularly, the purpose
and flagrancy of the official misconduct are all relevant.") (citations omitted).
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misconduct. 124 The quantum of evidence available to defendants for
suppression based on Miranda violations is not just greater; the burden of
proof is lighter. In these cases, once the violation has been established, the
burden shifts to the prosecution to prove that the statement should be
admitted despite the Miranda violation. 125 As of today, no court has held
that a defendant seeking suppression of evidence under Mirandabears the
additional burden of proving that defective Miranda procedures were
caused by deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent police misconduct or
systemic police illegality in the administration of Miranda protections,
which is paradoxical given the Supreme Court's consistent view that
Mirandadefects are not constitutional violations.
C. HERRING MUDDIES THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN WARRANTAUTHORIZED AND WARRANTLESS SEARCHES

It is a fundamental principle of stare decisis that cases must be
sufficiently analogous for past precedent to govern. On its facts, Leon
appeared to be limited to warrant-based searches. This assumption was
recently confirmed in a 2012 study of over 700 federal appellate court
cases finding that, prior to Herring,Leon was applied almost exclusively
to warrant-based searches. 126 In Herring, Chief Justice Roberts began his
dramatic expansion of Leon with a distortion of the predicate question of
fact-the existence or non-existence of a valid warrant.

121Id. at 604 ("The voluntariness of the

statement is a threshold requirement. And
the burden of showing admissibility rests, of course, on the prosecution.") (citations
omitted).
125Id.; see also United States v. Augustus, No. 10-CR-629, 2012 WL 3241190, at *5

(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2012) (noting that once the defendant established a defect, the burden
shifted to the government to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant's
statements are admissible under a Miranda exception).
126

Hauhart & Choi, supra note 30, at 343-46.
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This is a simple question. The infamous affidavit waived by the
police at Dollree Mapp clearly was not a warrant,127 and the prosecutor
never argued that any of the seven officers sent to search her rooming
house reasonably believed that they were acting pursuant to a warrant. In
contrast, the facially-valid search warrant executed in "good faith" by
Officer Rombach in Leon clearly was128a warrant, despite subsequent
discovery of latent constitutional defects.
In Herring, there was no warrant at the time of the arrest and
search. Thus, it is surprising that Chief Justice Roberts described the
search in Herring as a seizure of "evidence . . . obtained in objectively
reasonable reliance on a subsequently recalled warrant." 129 The warrant for
Bonnie Dean Herring was not subsequently recalled; it had been recalled
five months before his arrest. Under nearly analogous circumstances less
than a decade earlier in Arizona v. Evans,13 the Court had candidly and
accurately acknowledged that a "police officer [who] acted in reliance on
a police record indicating the existence of an outstanding arrest warranta record that is later determined to be erroneous" executes "an arrest
resulting from an inaccurate computer record." 1 31 The Evans Court did not
muddy the analysis by mischaracterizing the evidence but properly treated
the search based on a mistake as warrantless.
Chief Justice Roberts' description of the "subsequently recalled
warrant" in Herring is misleading because it grants unprecedented
evidentiary weight to police testimony regarding their own beliefs.
Suppression motions following warrantless searches easily devolve into
credibility contests between the defendant and the police officer(s). To
suggest, as the Chief Justice has, that a police officer's self-serving belief
127 Mapp v. Ohio,

367 U.S. 643, 644-45 (1961).

128

United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 925-26 (1984).

129

Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 146 (2009) (emphasis added).

13' 514
31

1

U.S. 1 (1995).

Id. at 4-6.
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may function as a quasi-warrant will complicate this inquiry, as similar
problems inevitably arise:
Our courts experience daily computer errors: a court clerk,
upon hearing an angry judge's mere warning, "Next time
I'll issue a bench warrant," incorrectly enters a "warrant
issued" notation, or even more simply, inaccurately notes
"warrant issued" against the wrong party in her daily stack
of cases due to similarity in names or dates of birth. These
cases, as well as a myriad of other such errors, involve no
warrant ever being issued against the arrestee in the first

place. 132
After Herring,illegally seized evidence can be admitted based on police
testimony describing a short-lived, mistaken belief that a long-vacated
warrant was valid.
The inaccurate reference to a "subsequently recalled warrant"
could also be designed to distract attention from the Court's elision of the
historical distinctions between warrant-based and warrantless searches.
The Fourth Amendment speaks directly to the requirement of a warrant,
which was originally assumed to be an essential component of a
reasonable search. Warrant-based searches are, as a matter of theory and
practice, more amenable to exceptions like "good faith" because warrants
impose clear evidence-gathering limitations, require neutral pre-execution
scrutiny and authorization, and create a paper trail capable of postexecution review. In contrast, the constitutionality of warrantless searches
is determined based on self-interested recollections and speculations of the
same police officers who conducted the investigation.

132

George M. Dery III, The UnwarrantedExtension of the Good Faith Exception to

Computers: An Examination ofArizona v. Evans andIts Impact on the ExclusionaryRule
and the Structure ofFourthAmendment Litigation, 23 AM. J. CRiv. L. 61, 83 (1995).
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D. THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING
Defendants in federal and state court may seek a pretrial
evidentiary hearing to build a record supporting suppression. The
evidentiary hearing confers strategic advantages by enabling crossexamination of police officer participants, which may yield persuasive
defense evidence. An evidentiary hearing also serves to memorialize
testimonial inconsistencies and contradictions by police witnesses for
subsequent defense use at trial, regardless of the hearing outcome.
From the perspective of the screening judge or magistrate, the
evidentiary hearing serves to "assist the court in ruling upon a defendant's
specific allegations of unconstitutional conduct." 133 Justice Breyer recently
described the suppression hearing process as follows:
Defendants frequently move to suppress evidence on
Fourth Amendment grounds. In many, perhaps most, of
these instances the police, uncertain of how the Fourth
Amendment applied to the particular factual circumstances
they faced, will have acted in objective "good faith." Yet,
in a significant percentage of these instances, courts will
find that the police were wrong. And, unless the police
conduct falls into one of the exceptions previously noted,
courts have required the suppression of the evidence
seized. 134
Under the federal rules and their state counterparts, judges have wide
latitude to grant or refuse evidentiary hearing requests. 135
Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and similar
state rules do not specify when a defense request for an evidentiary
133 United States v. Hines, 628 F.3d 101, 105 (3d Cir. 2010).
134

Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2439 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting).

135

See FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(c) (the court "may" schedule a motion hearing); see also

United States v. Sophie, 900 F.2d 1064, 1071 (7th Cir. 1990) (a suppression hearing
should not be granted "just because a party asks for one").
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hearing on a suppression motion should be granted. In the absence of a
clear standard, courts have generally held that a defendant's motion
seeking an evidentiary hearing must establish a "colorable claim." 136 This
may be a difficult hurdle for any defendant relying solely on a first-hand
account of events because, to be "colorable," a claim "must consist of
more than mere bald-faced allegations of misconduct." 137 Thus, judges
may properly deny a hearing request unless the defendant has proffered
evidence establishing that a hearing is necessary to determine "issues
of
138
claim."
constitutional
defendant's
the
of
resolution
the
to
material
fact
Judicial discretion to grant an evidentiary hearing on a suppression
motion may be further constrained by relevant case law. For example, the
Second Circuit has held that such hearings should be granted only "if the
moving papers are sufficiently definite, specific, detailed, and
nonconjectural to enable the court to conclude that contested issues of fact
...are in question." 139 More recently, the First Circuit held that a hearing
"is required only if the movant makes a sufficient threshold showing that
material facts are in doubt or dispute, and that such facts cannot reliably
be resolved on a paper record." 140 This decision elaborated on an earlier
Ninth Circuit decision finding that "[a]n evidentiary hearing on a motion
to suppress need be held only when the moving papers allege facts with
sufficient definiteness, clarity, and specificity to enable the trial court to
conclude that contested issues of fact exist." 141 Because the only evidence
of illegality available to many defendants is their own first-hand account,
136

See, e.g., United States v. Brink, 39 F.3d 419, 424 (3d Cir. 1994) (hearing

required if defendant alleged facts that, if true, "could violate a defendant's rights").
137

United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1067 (3d Cir. 1996).

138
Id.
139

United States v. Watson, 404 F.3d 163, 167 (2d Cir. 2005).

14

United States v. Cintron, 724 F.3d 32, 36 (1st Cir. 2013) (emphasis added).

141 United States v. McTiernan, 695 F.3d 882, 891 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing United

States v. Quoc Viet Hoang, 486 F.3d 1156, 1163 (9th Cir. 2007)).

ExclusionaryRule

2015]

when judges deny defendants' hearing requests they preclude the
additional evidence, which may ensure that the
defendant from developing
142
motion will fail.

Even when a defendant has proffered sufficient evidence to
establish a colorable suppression claim, the rules governing evidentiary
hearing procedures operate to the defendant's disadvantage. With the
exception of privileges, federal and state rules of evidence do not apply
during suppression hearings. 143 Although this practice may be expeditious,
the routine admission of hearsay evidence typically benefits only the
prosecution. 144

112 Under these new rules, suppression hearings may not be available even when
defendants have amassed significant evidence of police misconduct. For example, in
Cintron, the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress and refusal to grant
an evidentiary hearing was upheld despite the fact that the defendant's affidavit rebutting
the officer's assertion that the gun was in plain view included a sworn statement that, at
the time of his arrest, the defendant's gun was concealed in his buttoned right pocket and:

[W]as not visible and that the troopers did not discover the gun in his
pocket until after they had frisked him. The federal defender [had] also
submitted photographs of: 1) Cintron's jacket; 2) a gun similar to the
one possessed by Cintron; 3) the jacket containing the gun in a pocket
lying on a table; and 4) a model wearing the jacket containing the gun
in the pocket. The gun does not protrude from the pocket in either of
the latter two photographs ... Finding that the government letters did
not materially alter the troopers' accounts of the stop, the court found
no basis to revisit the holding that the gun was in plain view before it
was seized.
724 F.3d at 35-36.
143 United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 173-74 (1974) (noting that the district
court deciding defendant's motion to suppress "is not bound by the Rules of Evidence
except those with respect to privilege").
"' United States v. Merritt, 695 F.2d 1263, 1269-71 (10th Cir. 1982) (court may rely
on hearsay evidence during suppression hearing).
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As illustrated in a Tenth Circuit case admitting police hearsay
statements during a suppression hearing, 145 courts rely on police hearsay
to bolster testimony from an executing officer that a warrantless search
was based on probable cause. According to this court:
If the police may rely on hearsay, even the hearsay of an
anonymous but reliable informant, as the basis for
reasonable suspicion to make a stop, they should also be
permitted to offer that same hearsay as testimony to support
their reasonable suspicion when a defendant moves to
suppress evidence
on the ground that reasonable suspicion
14 6
did not exist.
These situations are not analogous. Police officers investigating a
crime rely on hearsay because the exigencies of police work can demand
prompt decision-making, not because these statements are necessarily
more reliable. We tolerate mid-investigation police officer reliance on
hearsay precisely because the pretrial suppression hearing interposes a
reliability failsafe of judicial review between investigation and disposition.
After the suppression hearing, the court will determine whether police
search and seizure decisions based on hearsay statements were actually
supported by probable cause. Thus, it makes little sense to posit, as the
Tenth Circuit has, that investigative exigency short cuts should govern
post hoc judicial review intended to identify and ameliorate the very
problems created by those exigencies.
Finally, a small but growing body of new empirical research
provides insight into the evidentiary hearing process in the state courts.
Professor Tonja Jacobi recently conducted a meta-analysis of various
suppression research projects. 14 7 She began by examining the early postMapp studies, which showed that police officers responded to the
nationwide imposition of the exclusionary rule in the state courts with a
145

Id. at 1270.

146

Id.

147 Jacobi, supra note 6, at 608-11.
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dramatic increase in (presumably perjured) testimony. 148 Specifically,
police testimony explaining that contraband was discovered, not as the
result of a search, but in "plain view," either in the suspect's hands or on
the ground nearby, significantly increased after Mapp.149 These findings
are consistent with the justifiably famous 1992 Orfield study finding that
"95% of Chicago police and 97% of judges, public defenders, and
prosecutors believed that police officers changed their testimony to avoid
evidence exclusion and that many judges failed to suppress evidence when
they knew searches were illegal." 150 Paradoxically, Herring and Davis
may actually reduce police perjury because-by increasing the burden on
defendants to prove both illegality and bad faith or systemic negligence
and eliminating burden shifting to the prosecution-today fewer police
witnesses need to lie for prosecutors to win suppression motions.
E. APPELLATE REVIEW
Decisions on suppression motions are treated like all other
evidentiary decisions for appellate review purposes. If a trial court denies
a defense motion to suppress (with or without granting an evidentiary
hearing) the decision can be reviewed on appeal only for abuse of
discretion. 151 Defendants who plead guilty in federal or state court do not

8

Id. at 608 (citing Comment, Effect of/llapp v. Ohio on Police Search and Seizure

Practicesin Narcotics Cases, 4 COLUM. J.L. & SOC.
149
15

PROBS.

87, 100 (1968)).

[d.

o1d. at 608-09 (citing Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence,Perjuryand the Heater

Factor:An ExclusionaryRule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. REv. 75
(1992)).
151 See, e.g., In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in East Africa, 552 F.3d
157, 165 (2d Cir. 2008) ("The denial of a defendant's request for a suppression hearing is

reviewed for abuse of discretion.").
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automatically waive their right to appeal a denial of a suppression
motion. 152
III. THE SUPREME COURT CONSIDERS THE OPERATION OF THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE

Over the past century, the Supreme Court has regularly reflected

on how well the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rule serve to
balance individual privacy against the effective enforcement of our
criminal laws. A majority of the Roberts Court now views the deterrence
of egregious police misconduct as the sole objective of the exclusionary
rule. However, the Court arrived at its current calibration only after
extensive and repeated consideration of a range of issues, including, on
occasion, the pragmatic operation of the exclusionary rule. What follows
is not a comprehensive doctrinal history of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. Instead, it is a narrowly-focused exploration of the Justices'
evolving views on the actual operation of the exclusionary rule, revealing
how procedural impediments constrain the scope of substantive rights.
A. EXCLUSION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS

When the exclusionary rule was announced a century ago in Weeks
v. United States,153 the case involved federal agents investigating an illegal
lottery. These agents "unlawfully" conducted a warrantless search of the
defendant's home, seizing "all of his books, letters, money, papers, notes,
evidences of indebtedness, stock, certificates, insurance policies, deeds,
abstracts, and other muniments of title, bonds, candies, clothes, and other

152

See, e.g., United States v. Abramski, 706 F.3d 307, 314-15 (4th Cir. 2013)

(appellate court had discretion to address denial of defendant's motion to suppress despite
the fact that his guilty plea did not specifically identify this motion).
153
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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property in said home[.]" 154 With no clear remedy, Mr. Weeks simply
asked that the evidence be returned to him before trial. The trial judge
agreed that the warrantless search had violated the Fourth Amendment,
but instead ordered that all irrelevant materials be returned to Mr. Weeks,
which enabled the federal prosecutor 155to introduce all the relevant,
illegally-seized papers and letters at trial.
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Day announced a clear and
simple exclusionary rule designed to bar the future admission of all
evidence illegally seized by federal agents. 156 Under this new rule,
following sufficient defense proof that a search had violated the Fourth
Amendment, the remedy of exclusion should inure. According to the
Weeks Court, permitting the use of illegally-seized evidence would "affirm
by judicial decision a manifest neglect, if not an open defiance, of the
prohibitions of the Constitution, intended for the protection of the people
against such unauthorized action." 157 If the remedy was denied after:
letters and private documents .. . [were] seized and held
and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an
offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his
right to be secure against such searches and seizures, is of
no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned,
might as well be stricken from the Constitution. 151
According to Professor Thomas Clancy, Justice Day was writing during
"an era of muscular individual rights, including rights afforded by the
Fourth Amendment, and the Weeks Court enforced those rights with an

154
15 5

Id. at 387.

[d.

156[d.
157
58

1

Id. at 394.
Id. at 393.
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equally strong remedy." 15 9 The presumption of near-automatic operation
of remedial access was based on the Court's explicit conclusion that the
remedy and right are non-severable. 160 According to the Weeks Court,
suppression protects and preserves the right by curbing "the tendency of
those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain conviction by
means of unlawful seizures." 16 1 The new rule did not require proof of
police officer intent or individual harm.
Six years after Weeks, the Court expanded the exclusionary rule to
include derivative evidence. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States
involved the illegal seizure of papers and records by federal agents from a
place of business. 162 The government argued that Weeks precluded only
the introduction of illegally-seized tangible evidence, but not derivative
use of such evidence for other prosecution purposes. In a decision
dramatically altering the operation of the rule, Justice Holmes rejected the
possibility that the prosecution could "study the papers before it returns
them, copy them, and then use the knowledge that it has gained to call
upon the owners in a more regular form to produce them." 163 The
government had improperly sought to reduce the remedy to a "form of
words." 164 In response, the Silverthorne Court held that "[t]he essence of a
provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that

159

Clancy, supra note 3, at 358-59.

160

See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 938-39 (1984) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)

("[I]t is

clear why the question whether the exclusion of evidence would deter future
police misconduct was never considered a relevant concern in the early cases from Weeks
to Olmstead. In those fonative decisions, the Court plainly understood that the exclusion

of illegally obtained evidence was compelled not by judicially fashioned remedial
purposes, but rather by a direct constitutional command.").
161 Weeks, 232 U.S at 391-92.
162
251
163

U.S. 384 (1920).

Id. at 390.

164 Id.
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not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that
it shall not be used at all." 165 After Silverthorne, the prosecution could
avoid exclusion only if it could prove that the evidence did not result from
the illegal search, but instead derived from a lawful "independent
source." 166

B.

EXCLUSION IN THE STATE COURTS

After a robust introduction and three decades of operational
expansion in the federal courts, exclusion in the states had a rocky start in
1949 in Wolf v. Colorado.167 Until Wolf, the Court had addressed the
operation of the exclusionary rule in relatively few cases, most of which
involved federal gambling investigations and warrantless FBI searches of
homes and businesses. Wolf with its interesting and provocative facts
posed new and more challenging suppression questions.
In the mid-1940s, the Denver police suspected that Dr. Julius Wolf
was performing illegal abortions. 16 8 Based solely on this "suspicion," state
police officers entered the defendant's medical office without a warrant
and seized his medical appointment record books, which were introduced
against him at trial. It is impossible to estimate the extent to which Wolf
was shaped by the powerful normative questions of reproductive control in
the mid-twentieth century, but it would be naive to assume that the nature
of the illegally-seized evidence was irrelevant to the Justices' decision to
avoid this moral morass by continuing to defer to the states.
Justice Frankfurter, who wrote for the Wolf majority, quickly
concluded that Dr. Wolf s medical records were protected against illegal
searches conducted by federal and state actors. According to the Wolf
165

Id. at 392.

166Id.

167
338
68

U.S. 25 (1949).

1 1d. at 25.
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Court, the security of privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." 16 9 Yet the Court held that the
remedy of suppression was not available to Dr. Wolf In Justice
Frankfurter's view, "in a prosecution in a State court for a State crime the
Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid the admission of evidence
obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure," 170 because the
exclusionary rule is not a constitutional command, but "a matter of judicial
implication." 17 1 As one commentator has speculated, in Wolf, "the Court
engaged in a radical reordering of the relationship of the exclusionary rule
to the substantive protections of the Amendment within a due process
framework." 172 States remained free to add exclusionary rules to their own
constitutions, 17 3 but the Wolf Court's attenuation of the right and remedy
ensured that the remaining states could continue to rely on a range of
"alternative" non-exclusion remedies. 174

169

Id. at 28.

17°Id.

at 33; see also Clancy, supra note 3, at 362-63 ("Wolf was thus a begrudging
extension of constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizures to state
actors. Justice Frankfurter, the author of Wolf, was a consistent advocate of a view of due
process that saw that right as not incorporating all of the Fourth Amendment's
features.").
171 Wolf, 338 U.S. at 28.
172

See Clancy, supra note 3, at 361.

173 Clancy,

supra note 3, at 383 (noting that in the pre- Wolf era, states relied on state
constitutions to justify adoption of the exclusionary rule).
174 According to the Wolf Court, states provided numerous civil remedies including
damages from: (1) the officer who conducted the search; (2) the officer who procured the
warrant (if it was done maliciously and without probable cause); (3) the magistrate (if he
acted without jurisdiction in issuing the warrant); and (4)any persons who assisted in the
execution of the illegal search. See Wolf, 338 U.S. at 30 n. 1. The Wolf Court also cited a
range of state statutory protections including punishment for: (1) maliciously procuring a
search warrant; (2) willfully exceeding one's authority in executing a search warrant; (3)
issuing a general search warrant; or, (4) issuing a warrant unsupported by affidavit. Id. at
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C. ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES
In Justice Frankfurter's opinion, exclusion was not uniformly
required to preserve fundamental Fourth Amendment protections because
these interests could be adequately protected by alternative means.
However, even at the time, the Wolf Court's pragmatic assumption that
defendants could avail themselves of substitute remedies was factually
unsupportable. Specifically, the Court simply ignored both the additional
evidentiary burdens placed on any defendant seeking an alternative
remedy and the inadequacy of these remedies as a substitute for
suppression. For example, to recover civil damages under the law of
several states, defendants had to prove that the search was illegal and (1)
that a police officer acted with malicious intent; (2) that the magistrate
who issued the warrant lacked jurisdiction; or, (3) that the warrant was so
lacking in specificity that it was the equivalent of a general warrant. 175
These operational obstacles were not lost on Justice Murphy, who wryly
observed in his dissent, "[s]elf-scrutiny is a lofty ideal, but its exaltation
reaches new heights if we expect a District Attorney to prosecute himself
or his associates for well-meaning violations of the search and seizure
clause during a raid the District Attorney or his associates have
ordered." 176 More importantly, in the unlikely event that a defendant
satisfied this burden, even non-negligible civil damages would provide
cold comfort to the defendant convicted based on illegally-seized
evidence.
Wolf survived for a dozen years while the exclusionary rule gained
traction in the state courts. In 1961, in Mapp v. Ohio, the Court would cite
a national trend towards exclusion in the state courts as one of many
29, 30 n. 1 (finding that "(t)he contrariety of views of the States" on the adoption of the
exclusionary rule of Weeks was "particularly impressive").
175 Wolf, 338 U.S. at 30 n.1.
176
Id. at 42 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
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reasons to overturn Wolf 177 According to Justice Clark, who wrote for the
Mapp majority, Wolf had been correct that "the exclusion doctrine [is] an
essential part of the right to privacy," but incorrect in withholding the
remedy, which reduced the Fourth Amendment to a "form of words,
valueless and undeserving of mention." 17 8 Professor Donald Dripps has
characterized Mapp as "faithfully reflect[ing] the doctrinal incoherence of
the federal exclusionary rule cases. " 17 9 But the Mapp Court's conclusion,
that without the exclusionary rule, courts "grant the right but in reality...
withhold its privilege and enjoyment," marked the short-lived apotheosis
of exclusion as a near constitutional mandate. 180
The Mapp Court directly addressed the pragmatic operation of the
exclusionary rule in its lengthy discussion of California practice. Justice
Clark began by observing that the type of civil alternatives to exclusion
contemplated in Wolf had proved "worthless and futile," 18 1 because they
"have completely failed to secure compliance with the constitutional
provisions." 182 The Mapp Court relied principally on findings cited in
8
People v. Cahan, a 1955 decision from the California Supreme Court. 183
According to the Wolf Court, in 1949, two-thirds of the states had rejected the
exclusionary rule. See Wolf 338 U.S. at 42. But by 1961, the remedy had been adopted
(in whole or part) by just over half of the states. The shift may principally have been
177

attributable to Justice Jackson's call to arms in Irvine v. California,347 U.S. 128, 134

(1954) ("Now that the Wolf doctrine [the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment is
enforceable against the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth] is
known to them, state courts may wish further to reconsider their evidentiary rules. But to
upset state convictions even before the states have had adequate opportunity to adopt or
reject the [exclusionary] rule would be an unwarranted use of federal power.").
171
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-56 (1961).
179 Dripps, supra note 69, at 747.
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655-56.
181

Id. at 652.

182

Id. at 651.

"" 282 P.2d 905 (1955). The court stated:
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In Cahan, the state court held that "case after case has appeared in our
appellate reports describing unlawful searches and seizures against the
defendant on trial, and those cases undoubtedly reflect only a small
fraction of the violations of the constitutional provisions that have actually
occurred." 184 California's experience demonstrated that Fourth
Amendment rights were essentially unprotected because "reported cases
involving civil actions against police officers are rare, and those involving
successful criminal prosecutions against officers are nonexistent.'" 185 In
retrospect, the discussion of alternative remedies is especially prescient as
the principal difficulty is the defendant's inability to prove police malice
or bad faith.
D. THE MECHANICS OF BURDEN SHIFTING TO THE
PROSECUTION

1. BURDEN SHIFTING GENERALLY

To understand how the Supreme Court has addressed the
pragmatic operation of burden shifting, we must return briefly to
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States. 186 In 1920, Silverthorne

established that, after the defendant had proved that the search or seizure
was illegal, the burden shifted to the prosecution to prove that evidence
When, as in the present case, the very purpose of an illegal search and
seizure is to get evidence to introduce at a trial, the success of the
lawless venture depends entirely on the court's lending its aid by
allowing the evidence to be introduced. It is no answer to say that a
distinction should be drawn between the govermnent acting as law
enforcer and the gatherer of evidence and the government acting as
judge.
Id. at 912.
184

Id. at 913.

18 5

Td.

186

251 U.S. 385 (1920).
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should not be excluded. In Silverthorne, the specific question was whether
the prosecution could establish that the evidence was not the result of the
illegal search but was instead derived from a lawful independent source. 17
A half-century later, in Wong Sun v. United States,188 the Court clarified
that after "granting the establishment of the primary illegality" based on
defense proof by a preponderance of the evidence, the burden shifts to the
prosecution to prove that "the evidence ... has been come at by
...means
the primary taint." 189

sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of
Suppression burden shifting to the prosecution is not unique. The
Supreme Court has created identical burden shifting procedures in
analogous contexts. In Brown v. Illinois, the Court stated that, following
defense proof of a Miranda violation, "the burden of showing
admissibility rests, of course, on the prosecution." 1 90 In Mirandacases, the
Court has specified that, following defense proof of an illegal arrest and
subsequent custodial interrogation, the prosecutor bears the burden of
proving that the confession was not obtained by exploitation of the illegal
arrest' 9 1 and that this burden cannot be satisfied by proof that Miranda
warnings were given and waived. 192

While the Silverthorne Court clearly opined that information contained in
illegally obtained evidence should not always be "sacred and inaccessible," it is
interesting to note that the facts of Silverthorne did not actually support an independent
source argument by the government in that case. See id. at 392.
187

"' 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
189

1d. at 488.
190 Brownv. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975).
191Id.
192

Dunaway v. New York, 422 U.S. 200, 217 (1979).
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2. PROSECUTION PROOF OF REASONABLE POLICE "GOOD
FAITH": UNITED STATES V. LEON

The most substantive reevaluation of the pragmatic mechanics of
exclusion did not occur until 1984.193 The facts of United States v. Leon
are simple. The case began with a 1981 investigation into drug trafficking
in Burbank, California. The state police received an anonymous tip that
Alberto Leon was storing drugs in multiple locations and sought a search
warrant. 194 However, the affidavit filed in state court to establish probable
cause for the search contained two defects: (1) it lacked any information
regarding the reliability of the informant; and, (2) it failed to provide a
nexus between the confidential tip received by the state police and Alberto
Leon. 195 Because the search warrant was issued pursuant to the defective
affidavit, 196 the defendant challenged the legality of the search and the
admission of the seized narcotics. 197 The reviewing court found that the
search had been illegal because it was not supported by probable cause,
and that evidence resulting from the illegal search should have been
suppressed. 198
The U.S. Supreme Court began Leon by concluding that exclusion
is not "a personal constitutional right" but "a judicially created remedy
designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its
deterrent effect[.]" 199 This conclusion, which the Court based on United

193 Td.

194 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 900-02 (1984).
19 5

Td.

19 6

Td. at 904.

19 7

Td. at 903.

19 8

Id.

199Id. at 906 (citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)).
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States v. Calandra,200 would eventually redound to all subsequent
exclusion cases. 201
The Leon Court's new burden-shifting provision would prove
equally, if not more, consequential than its denigration of the remedy's
constitutional bona fides. According to Justice White, who wrote for the
Leon majority, the prosecution is entitled to prove that "a reasonably well
trained officer" 20 2 would not have known that "the search was illegal in

21'414 U.S. at 348. Given the centrality of Calandrato the Leon Court and its

ubiquitous place in contemporary exclusion jurisprudence as the case that deconstitutionalized exclusion, it may be surprising to know that police deterrence was not
an essential or obvious concern for the CalandraCourt. Thus, dicta from the decision to
the effect that "the rule's prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police misconduct"
was not clearly or necessarily intended as a generalization. Id. at 347. Instead, it is
equally or more likely that the Court was describing its narrow finding that the
defendants lacked standing to object to the admission of illegally obtained evidence in the
grand jury because the role of the grand jury is to investigate and not to prosecute crimes.
This interpretation is further supported by the fact that the Court did not address police
deterrence in any detail, noting merely that the only police officer likely to be deterred by
excluding evidence from the grand jury was the hypothetical officer who conducted an
"investigation consciously directed toward the discovery of evidence solely for use in a
grand jury investigation." Id. at 351. This led Justice Brennan to complain in his dissent
that "[t]his downgrading of the exclusionary rule to a determination whether its
application in a particular type of proceeding furthers deterrence of future police
misconduct reflects a startling misconception, unless it is a purposeful rejection, of the
historical objective and purpose of the rule." Id. at 356 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
201 Calandra,decided just a decade after Mapp, has routinely been characterized by
courts and commentators as the case that "de-constitutionalized" the exclusionary
remedy. See, e.g., Mvichigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 437 (1974) ("We have recently
said, in [Calandra],that the exclusionary rule's 'prime purpose is to deter future unlawful
police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against
unreasonable searches and seizures."'); Clancy, supra note 3, at 367 (referring to
Calandraas the case where the Court "emphatically de-constitutionalized" the
exclusionary rule); Cloud, supra note 10, at 510 (noting "the Supreme Court altered the
face of exclusionary theory with a single opinion ....United States v. Calandra").
212 Leon, 468 U.S. at 922.
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light of all of the circumstances. 20 3 If the prosecutor satisfies this burden,
any "reliable physical evidence seized by officers reasonably relying on a
warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate . . . should be

admissible in the prosecution's case in chief.,204 Astute commentators
have opined that Leon conflates two different standards because "the term,
'reasonable good-faith belief,' seems to be both objective and subjective[;]
...[t]hat is, the policeman must subjectively believe in the validity of the
warrant, and that belief must be objectively reasonable. 20 5 Even if the
requirement of subjective good faith was implicit, the Leon Court clearly
contemplated that future courts would review evidence of illegality from
the perspective of an objectively reasonable police officer. Leon was a
significant departure from previous exclusionary rule jurisprudence, but it
played little, if any, role in warrantless searches until the Roberts Court
got involved.

203

Id.

204

Id. at 913.

205

See Craig M. Bradley, The ReasonablePoliceman: PoliceIntent in Criminal

Procedure,76 MISS. L.J. 339, 353-54 (2006) (noting that evidence of police officer state

of mind regarding the legal standard of probable cause is actually irrelevant to the
determination because "the test in warrant cases is whether a reasonable officer would
have believed in the warrant's validity"); Dery, supra note 34, at 26 (noting that the
problem with Herringwas that the Court created a new "inquiry [that] stripped the
straightforward assessment of what a reasonable person would do in a particular
circumstance.... [and] leads to questions of intent and motivation of a particular person
and inquiry explicitly rejected by the court in Whren"); Orin S. Kerr, Good Faith,New
Law, and the Scope of the ExclusionaryRule, 99 GEO. L.J. 1077, 1105 (2011) (suggesting

that although "the Leon opinion made clear that the Court had in mind an objective
inquiry into costs and benefits: the proper inquiry was objective reasonableness, not
subjective good faith ....

[b]ut the phrase 'good faith' has led some courts to assume that

the good faith exception applies when an officer acts in subjective good faith"); Kinports,
supra note 34, at 840 (noting that "the standard adopted in Herringis quite different from
the objective standard of reasonableness articulated in Leon and its earlier progeny")
(citations omitted).
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IV. THE NEW FAUX REASONABLE POLICE OFFICER "GOOD FAITH"
STANDARD

A. THE HERRING AND DAVIS COURTS APPLY LEON
A quarter century after Leon, Chief Justice Roberts created a new
faux reasonable police officer "good faith" standard. The new standard is
faux for two reasons. First, it does not rely on objective standards. Second,
it requires defendants to prove actual police bad faith. Ignoring the
obvious and longstanding distinctions between warrantless and warrantbased warrantless searches, Herring contains seventeen separate citations
to UnitedStates v. Leon. 206 The HerringCourt dismissed concerns that the
imposition of new evidentiary requirements would result in "an inquiry
into the subjective awareness of arresting officers" because "[w]e have
already held [in Leon] that 'our good-faith inquiry is confined to the
objectively ascertainable question whether a reasonably well trained
officer would have known that the search was illegal' in light of 'all of the
circumstances.',207 Two years later, the Roberts Court would engage in a
similar blurring of the distinction between warrantless and warrant-based
searches in Davis, which cited ten times to Leon 2 0 8 and purported to
contemplate a fully objective standard. However, in Davis, the analogy to
Leon is somewhat more plausible given the police officer's objectively
reasonable reliance on then-valid United States Supreme Court precedent.
The faux nature of the Herring/Davis reasonable police officer
"good faith" standard is revealed though an examination of the evidence.
Under Leon, a prosecutor seeking to establish reasonable "good faith"
reliance on a warrant could proffer evidence that the police officer had
"obtained a search warrant from a judge or magistrate and acted within its

216 555 U.S. 135 (2009).
217Id. at 145 (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n.23).
218

See Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011).
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scope., 209 The "good faith" inference could be substantiated by this
evidence because, for all warrant-based searches, "[i]t is the magistrate's
responsibility to determine whether the officer's allegations establish
probable cause and, if so, to issue a warrant comporting in form with the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment. ,2 1 0 In the Leon Court's view, the
"search warrant provides the detached scrutiny of a neutral magistrate...
a more reliable safeguard against improper searches than the hurried
judgment of a law enforcement officer engaged in the often competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime.", 2 11 No reasonable reading of Leon
supports the Herring Court's extension of this rationale to warrantless
searches where such documentary evidence, including the warrant,
affidavit, and other supporting paperwork, is unavailable for review.

B. FRANKS V. DELA WARE
The Herring Court also relied on Franks v. Delaware,2 1 2 as an
"analogy," to justify the new extension of the "good faith" exception to
warrantless searches. 213 In Chief Justice Roberts' view, Herring and
Franks are analogous because both cases involved pretrial judicial
assessment of "false information provided by the police., 21 4 However,
even a superficial inspection of Franks reveals that the case is
procedurally and substantively distinct.

219 Leon, 468 U.S. at 920.
210 [d.
211

_d. at 913.

212 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
213

Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 145 (2009) ("Our decision in Franks v.

Delaware... provides an analogy.").
214 Id.
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Franks is procedurally distinct because the Court did not address
the judicial assessment of defense evidence establishing police culpability.
Instead, Franks was the first Supreme Court challenge to the "four
corners" of the warrant rule, which raised the very different question of
whether defense challenges involving evidence outside the warrant and
affidavit are procedurally barred.215 A basic understanding of the facts is
essential to comprehension of the unique procedural question before the
Franks Court.
In Franks, detectives investigating an alleged rape received a
detailed description of the assailant's clothing from the victim. 216 Based

on this information, the detectives submitted a sworn affidavit in support
of a search warrant application purporting to recount two separate
telephone interviews confirming that the defendant typically wore an
outfit matching the described apparel. 217 No other evidence supporting
probable cause was provided to the magistrate. Before trial, it was
revealed that both telephone interviews were complete fabrications. 21 8 The
trial judge applied the "four-corners" rule and denied both the defendant's
request for a suppression hearing and his motion to suppress.219 The
Delaware Supreme Court affirmed, finding that, under the "four corners"
rule, "under no circumstances could any defendant challenge the22veracity
of a sworn statement used by police to procure a search warrant. , 0
When the case reached the Supreme Court, the Justices opted to
ignore the proof requirements for suppression and instead focused solely
on the threshold question of the continued viability of the "four corners"

215

Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 156 (1978).

216 Td.
217 Td.
218
2 19

22 0

Id.
Td.
Td.

at 158.
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rule. The fact that Franks was cabined to the predicate question of whether
the defendant could seek an evidentiary hearing is essential to the Court's
decision. To the extent that the Franks Court inquired into the police
officers' "deliberate or reckless disregard for the truth," it was not engaged
in a general assessment of police misconduct for suppression (or any
other) purpose. Instead, in Franks, the Court was seeking a pragmatic
alternative to the "four corners" rule. Herringmisreads Franks as a broad
decision on police officer bad faith. In fact, the Franks Court was merely
attempting to set limits on defense access to suppression hearings to avoid
opening the floodgates to every defendant who argued that police officers
could have exercised greater care during the investigation.
Similarly, as a matter of substantive law, Franks provides no
precedential support for Herring. Justice Blackmun, who wrote for the
Franks majority, never suggested that suppression should be contingent
only on deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent constitutional violations,
nor did the Court even consider warrantless searches. 221 Instead, the
Franks Court focused on the narrow goal of eliminating the "four corners"
rule because it imposed a "flat ban on impeachment of veracity [which]
could denude the probable-cause requirement of all real meaning" by
incentivizing and immunizing police perjury and reckless disregard for the
truth.22 2
Why does the Herring Court cite Franks if the case is inapposite?
Perhaps Herringis designed to lay the groundwork for future attempts to

221

See Dery, supra note 34, at 26 (noting that "[i]n Franks, which considered a

motion to traverse a warrant, the Court found 'negligence or innocent mistake' to be
insufficient to support an attack on a warrant affidavit, instead requiring that the
misconduct rise to 'allegations of deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the
truth' and that "[t]he entire point of assessing a deliberate falsehood is to look inside an
individual's mind to see not only what he or she knew but also what he or she meant to
make others believe").
222 Franks, 438 U.S. at 156; see also United States v. DeLeon, 979 F.2d 761, 764

(9th Cir. 1992) (extending Franks to cases where defendants proved deliberate falsehood
or reckless omission by government official who was not the affiant).
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further align the two cases. In Franks, despite compelling direct and
persuasive defense evidence that the detectives lied to the magistrate, the
Court did not find that suppression was warranted, nor did the Court find
that the defendant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Instead, the
meager remedy prescribed in Franks is that deliberate or recklessly false
evidence must be stricken from the evidence supporting the warrant
application. 223 If the remaining evidence provides probable cause, the
defendant's request for an evidentiary hearing and for suppression should
be denied. 224 The fact that Chief Justice Roberts calls Franks a
suppression "analogy" is troubling for two reasons. As a general matter,
Franks clearly assumes that we should tolerate some systemic police
negligence and some police officer "bad faith" as long as the police do not
engage in shocking behavior that could support an inference of deliberate
or reckless misconduct. More specifically, linking the two cases raises
concern that the Court could impose Franks-type remedial limitations on a
range of future defendants by focusing on police misconduct that was
merely negligent.
C. PROOF OF POLICE "GOOD FAITH"
Over three decades ago, the Leon Court predicted that requiring
proof of actual (rather than reasonable) police bad faith, even in warrantbased cases, would "send[] state and federal courts on an expedition into
the minds of police officers [and] would produce a grave and fruitless

223

Franks,438 U.S. at 155.

224

See id. at 171-72; see also United States v. Friedemann, 210 F.3d 227, 229 (4th

Cir. 2000) (requiring suppression only if false statements were necessary to finding of
probable cause); Wilkes v. Young, 28 F.3d 1362, 1365 (4th Cir. 1994) ("[A] false or
misleading statement in a warrant affidavit does not constitute a Fourth Amendment
violation unless the statement is 'necessary to the finding of probable cause."') (internal
citations omitted).
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misallocation of judicial resources."225 A quarter century later, the Court
purports to avoid these pragmatic problems by simply averring that "the
pertinent analysis of deterrence and culpability is objective ' 226 and that
"the question ... whether to apply the exclusionary rule when the police
conduct a search . . . [is] objectively reasonable."227 These assurances,
especially in warrantless search cases, are either naive or disingenuous. 22 8
225

United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984).

226

Herringv. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 145 (2009).

227

Davis v. United States, 131 S.Ct. 2419, 2428 (2011).

22'As

discussed herein, Leon does not support an inference that the Herringpolice
culpability requirement will involve an inquiry limited to objective information.
Moreover, Chief Justice Roberts' second citation to Ornelasv. United States, 517 U.S.
690 (1996) is equally misplaced. In that case, the Court held that police determination of
probable cause and reasonable suspicion should be reviewed de novo based on the vast
amount of information known to the individual officer. The Court stated:
For example, what may not amount to reasonable suspicion at a motel
located alongside a transcontinental highway at the height of the
summer tourist season may rise to that level in December in
Milwaukee. That city is unlikely to have been an overnight stop
selected at the last minute by a traveler coming from California to
points east. The 85-mile width of Lake Michigan blocks any further
eastward progress. And while the city's salubrious summer climate and
seasonal attractions bring many tourists at that time of year, the same is
not true in December. Milwaukee's average daily high temperature in
that month is 31 degrees and its average daily low is 17 degrees; the
percentage of possible sunshine is only 38 percent. It is a reasonable
inference that a Californian stopping in Milwaukee in December is
either there to transact business or to visit family or friends. The

background facts, though rarely the subject of explicit findings, inform
the judge's assessment of the historical facts.
Id. at 699-700. Not only does Ornelasfail to address the distinction between an objective
and subjective inquiry, the enormous list of factors subjectively known to the police
officer and used to determine probable cause or reasonable suspicion reveals that any
determination of deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent culpability will focus on the
subjective knowledge and intent of the individual officer.
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Even the most inexperienced trial lawyer knows that calling a
standard "objective" does not magically eliminate the requirement that
judges ascertain the facts and information known to that police officer at
the time of that illegal search.2 29 In the exclusionary rule context, despite
repeated invocation of Leon, the Roberts Court cannot genuinely
contemplate an objective inquiry. The Davis Court effectively conceded as
much when it characterized the problem at hand as determining whether
the "officers who conducted the search . . . violate[d] Davis's Fourth
Amendment rights deliberately, recklessly, or with gross negligence. 2 30
The Herring Court reveals a similar weakness in its reliance on Franks,
which is discussed above. If Franks is an "analogy" to Herring,the Court
must remember that a Franks hearing is always a subjective inquiry,
because the defendant must prove that these police officers used false
statements or recklessly disregarded the truth when they applied for this
warrant.2 3 1 If Herring and Davis presage a subjective inquiry, this shift is
inconsistent with the Court's long-held view that "subjective intentions
play no role in ordinary... Fourth Amendment analysis."2 32 A subjective

229

See Kinports, supra note 34, at 842 (noting that after Herring,"proof of

reckless-and certainly deliberate-misconduct envisions a subjective inquiry into the
state of mind of the actual officer whose actions are in question"); Dery, supra note 34
(explaining that in Horton v. California,496 U.S. 128 (1990), the Court found that
"evenhanded law enforcement is best achieved by the application of objective standards
of conduct").
23' Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427.
231

See United States v. DeLeon, 979 F.2d 761, 765 (9th Cir. 1992) (extending

Franks to cases where defendants proved deliberate falsehood or reckless omission by
government official who was not the affiant).
232 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996); see also Missouri v. Seibert,
542 U.S. 600, 624-25 (2004) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (finding that a violation cannot
be based on police intent because "[t]houghts kept inside a police officer's head cannot
affect that experience" as "[a] suspect who experienced exactly the same interrogation...
save for a difference in the undivulged, subjective intent of the interrogating officer when
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inquiry also cannot be reconciled with the Court's longstanding
"recognition that application of the exclusionary rule does not require
233
inquiry into the mental state of the police. ,
Professor Albert Alschuler agrees that there are sound reasons to
doubt that the Herring "inquiry can be confined to the objectively
ascertainable Leon question of whether a reasonably well trained officer
would have known that the search was illegal. 2 3 4 In his view, Herring
created a "partly subjective standard" 235 because, as Chief Justice Roberts'
suggested, suppression might be based on defense proof that the "police
have been shown . . . to have knowingly made false entries to lay the
groundwork for future false arrests. 2 36 According to the Herring Court,
"exclusion would certainly be justified under our cases should such
misconduct cause a Fourth Amendment violation." 237 In Professor
Alschuler's view, the Chief Justice's hypothetical is utter fiction, because
it is pragmatically impossible for any defendant to obtain proof that police
officers "knowingly made false entries to lay the groundwork for future
false arrests., 238 Even if such proof were available, the police officers who

he failed to give Miranda warnings, would not experience the interrogation any
differently").
233 Herringv. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 157 n.7 (2009); see also Seibert, 542 U.S.
at 625-26 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[A]n exception... for intentional [Miranda]

violations would require focusing constitutional analysis on a police officer's subjective
intent, an unattractive proposition that we all but uniformly avoid.").
234

Alschuler, supra note 2, at 487 (citing Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 145

(2009)).
235 Id.
236

Id. at 488 (citing Herring,555 U.S. at 145).

237 Td.
238 Td.
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make the mistakes would inevitably offer innocent explanations for their
past behavior.239
V. APPLICATION OF THE FAUX "GOOD FAITH" STANDARD IN THE
LOWER COURTS
A. RECENT EXAMINATION OF THE IMPACT OF LEON

There have been few empirical studies of the effects of Supreme
Court cases. Thus, very recent efforts to measure Leon's effects in the
federal courts are of note.24 °
In a study published in 2012, Professors Robert Hauhart and
Courtney Choi found that two-thirds of reviewing judges accept the
veracity of police officer testimony when applying Leon to assess the
reasonable "good faith" of a police officer who has executed an illegal
warrant. 241 These researchers also found that, in Leon-based suppression
decisions, courts typically rely on evidence establishing that: (1) the
warrant was based "on a deliberately or recklessly false affidavit;, 242 (2)
the magistrate "abandoned his or her judicial role and failed to perform his
or her neutral and detached function;, 243 (3) the warrant "was based on an
affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief
in its existence entirely unreasonable;" 244 or (4) the warrant "was so
239 [d.
240

See Hauhart & Choi, supra note 30, at 318 (describing their research as "an

exploration of the application of the 'good faith' exception since its origination in 1984"
and their methods as "examin[ing] nearly a third of the federal court of appeals opinions
in which 'good faith' has been raised since that time").
241 See id. at 330 ("Approximately two-thirds (64.6% of the 175) federal appellate

decisions we examined will accept an officer's good faith claim.").
242 Id. at 324 (citing United States v. Harris, 464 F.3d 733, 739 (7th Cir. 2006)).
243

Id. at 325.

244

Id. at 326.
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facially deficient that it failed to particularize the place to be searched or
the things to be seized., 245 More generally, the researchers conclude that
before Herring and Davis, the federal courts consistently understood that
by creating this four-part test, the Leon "Court did not intend for the 'good
faith' exception to swallow the Fourth Amendment. 246
It is notable that, within the much smaller subset of cases rejecting
prosecution evidence of reasonable police "good faith," approximately
10% relied on evidence outside the four-part Leon test. 247 Thus, some
reviewing courts continued to suppress illegally seized evidence, despite
prosecution proof of police "good faith," especially in cases involving
warrantless searches. For example, in 1986, the Ninth Circuit noted that,
despite prosecution proof of reasonable police "good faith," evidence
illegally seized during a warrantless border search must be suppressed. 248
As the appellate court reasoned, proof of good faith was irrelevant because
"the officer, who was given broad authority to inspect vehicles on the
border, should have known that he had no authority to conduct those
searches., 249 Over a decade later, the Ninth Circuit used similar reasoning
to ignore prosecution evidence of police "good faith" during the illegal
seizure of evidence at a traffic stop.2

50

In this case, testimony from the

officer explaining his honest but mistaken belief that the defendant had
improperly affixed his vehicle registration sticker did not result in
application of the Leon "good faith" exception. Other post-Leon courts

245

Id. at 327.

246 See Hauhart

& Choi, supra note 30, at 328.

247

Id. at 336.

248

See id. at 338 (citing United States v. Whiting, 781 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1986)).

249

Id.
See id. at 339-40 (citing United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir.

250

2000)).
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have similarly refused to recognize police "good faith" exception evidence
in cases involving seizures of unreasonable duration.251
Based on this study, Professors Hauhart and Choi concluded that
"[t]he most common reason federal appellate courts ignore the argument
of police "good faith" is [because] they find nothing 'inherently
defective' with the affidavit and find probable cause is present in the
executed warrant." 252 However, as this study reveals, until recently,
federal appellate courts rejected evidence of police "good faith" in
warrantless search cases and in a range of factual circumstances. 253
B. A RECENT EXAMINATION OF THE IMPACT OF DAVIS
In the wake of the Supreme Court's 2012 decision in United States
v. Jones,2 54 defining the use of extended GPS surveillance as a "search"
under the Fourth Amendment, Professor Susan Freiwald has attempted to
measure suppression results post-Jones and post-Davis.255 Her research
reveals that "rather than beginning to answer the questions that Jones left
open, courts are largely avoiding substantive Fourth Amendment analysis
of location data privacy., 256 Professor Freiwald, whose research includes
the more recent post-Jones cases has found that courts are consistently
"finding that officers who engaged in GPS tracking and related
surveillance operated in "good faith" based on the new exception to the
251

See United States v. Song Ja Cha, 597 F.3d 995, 999-1000 (9th Cir. 2010) ("Of

course, a seizure reasonable at its inception... may become unreasonable as a result of
its duration or for other reasons.") (citations omitted).
252 See Hauhart & Choi, supra note 30, at 339-40.
253

Id.

251 132 U.S. 945 (2012).
255

Susan Freiwald, The Davis Good Faith Rules and GettingAnswers to the

Questions Jones Left Open, 14 N.C.J. L. & TECH. 341, 341-42 (2013).
25 6

Td.
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exclusionary remedy that the Supreme Court laid out in the 2011 case of
Davis v. United States. 2 5 7
The Jones decision may presage the development of new Fourth
Amendment guidelines responsive to police departments' rapidly
increasing access to new technologies. However, in Professor Freiwald's
view, the combination of these two cases is yielding especially
problematic results because, by "[flollowing Davis, lower courts are
refusing to grant a suppression remedy on appeal to targets of searches
that were almost surely unconstitutional under Jones. 2 5 8 Based on her
research, she has concluded that courts are using "[a] broad interpretation
of Davis [that] untethers officers' conduct from appellate precedent and
may lead courts to excuse that conduct, and refuse to engage the Jones's
questions, whenever judges consider the officers' conduct not to be
egregious., 259 Although Professor Freiwald's work is new and covers just
three years of case law, her work suggests that suppression will not be
available unless police officers engage in misconduct so shocking that it
supports an inference of bad faith.
C. OPERATING THE FAUX "GOOD FAITH" STANDARD

A review of recent federal court decisions confirms concerns
raised by commentators and the empirical research that the faux
reasonable police "good faith" standard will make constitutional violations
irremediable.

257 [d.
258
25 9

Id. at 344.
Id. at 379.
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1. THE OVERALL BALANCE
New federal appellate cases applying Herringare recalibrating the
balance of safety and liberty by finding that "the deterrent effect of
suppression must be substantial and outweigh any harm to the justice
system,', 260 that "suppression is not an automatic consequence of a Fourth
Amendment violation, ' , 261 and that "evidence should be suppressed 'only
if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may
properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional
under the Fourth Amendment." 262 These cases take a similar approach to
Davis, dictating that "[w]hether suppression is the right remedy in any
particular case requires, the Supreme Court has said, 'an assessment of the
competing social costs and benefits associated with exclusion,' ' 263 that
suppression should be granted only "[w]hen law enforcement officers
exhibit 'deliberate,' 'reckless,' or 'grossly negligent' disregard for Fourth
Amendment rights, the deterrent value of exclusion is strong and tends to
outweigh the resulting costs," 264 and that, to determine "whether law
enforcement personnel acted with an objectively reasonable good-faith
belief that their conduct was lawful, we must consider whether the totality

260

See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 734 F.3d 270, 277 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting

Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 147 (2009)).
261United States v. Smith, 741 F.3d 1211, 1218-19, (1 th Cir. Dec. 23, 2013)

(quoting Herring,555 U.S. at 137); United States v. Stames, 501 F. App'x 379, 385 (6th
Cir. 2013) (quoting Herring,555 U.S. at 137); see also United States v. Brown, 631 F.3d
638, 647 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Herring,555 U.S. at 141).
262

United States v. Allen, 625 F.3d 830 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Herring,555 U.S. at

142-43).
263

United States v. Nicholson, 721 F.3d 1236, 1256 (10th Cir. 2013) (citing Davis,

131 S.Ct. at 2427).
264

United States v. Wright, 493 F. App'x 265, 271 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Davis,

131 S.Ct. at 2427).
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of circumstances is greater than the sum of its attendant parts., 265 Taken
together, Herring and Davis have clearly tipped the balance in favor of
admitting illegally seized evidence in all cases where defendants cannot
prove systemic misconduct or deliberate or reckless illegality.
2.

SUPPRESSION FOLLOWING WARRANT-AUTHORIZED
SEARCHES

As noted above, Professors Hauhart and Choi found that 90% of
successful suppression motions in the federal appellate courts were based
on defense proof that (1) the affidavit was deliberately or recklessly false,
(2) the magistrate failed to perform her neutral and detached function, (3)
the affidavit was so lacking in probable cause that official belief in its
existence was unreasonable, or (4) the warrant was facially deficient. 266 In
these cases, evidence supporting one or more of these conclusions ensured
suppression in the overwhelming majority of cases, regardless of
prosecution evidence of police "good faith." But this review of postHerring and post-Davis cases reveals that, despite defense proof of an
illegal search that falls within the Leon four-prong test, illegally seized
evidence is now routinely admitted.
For example, under the first prong, which is based on Franks v.
Delaware,2 6 7 suppression should be granted if the defendant has proved
that the warrant was based on "a deliberately or recklessly false
affidavit., 268 This approach was rejected by the Third Circuit in a case
admitting evidence seized illegally pursuant to a search warrant supported

265

United States v. Katzin, 732 F.3d 187, 211 (3d. Cir. 2013) (citing Davis, 131 S.

Ct. at 2427).
266

See Hauhart & Choi, supra note 30, at 336.

267 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
268

United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 924 (1984) (quoting United States v. Harris,

464 F.3d 733 (7th Cir. 2006)).
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by false police statements. 2 69 The Leon reasonable "good faith" exception
should not apply to cases where police officers evince a willful disregard
for the truth, 270 but, in United States v. Hicks, the appellate court reasoned
that Herring paved the way for admission of this evidence because the
defense had only proved "isolated negligence and had failed to prove that
the police officer's conduct demonstrated reckless disregard of the
Constitution." 27 1 Hicks sets the bar impossibly high by blocking
suppression even when a defendant can prove that a warrant was based on
deliberately or recklessly false police officer statements.
It is interesting to note that one year earlier in United States v.
272
Brown, in a similar case involving Franks evidence, the Third Circuit
reached the opposite conclusion. The Brown court held that the new
requirement of defense of police recklessness under Herring had "no
bearing on the defendant's constitutional rights, which are violated, if at
all, by the execution of a warrant obtained through the use of a materially
false application. ' 273 In fact, the court in Brown specifically concluded
that:
[T]he invention of baseless averments is plainly the sort of
behavior that exclusion can be expected to deter .... [and]
also a brand of behavior worth deterring ... [because] the
idea of a police officer fabricating facts or even entire

269

United States v. Hicks, 460 F. App'x 98, 102 (3d. Cir. 2012).

271

Hicks can be contrasted with a similar pre -Herringcase from the Sixth Circuit,

United States v. West, 520 F.3d 604 (6th Cir. 2008). The West Court found that no

amount of prosecution evidence of reasonable police "good faith" could prevent the
exclusion of evidence seized pursuant to a "bare bones" affidavit that failed to connect
the suspect's residence and van. See West, 520 F.3d at 610.
271

Hicks, 460 F. App'x at 102-03.

272 631 F.3d 638 (3d Cir. 2011).
273Id.at 647.
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affidavits in order to obtain probable cause is quite
obviously repugnant to the Fourth Amendment.274
In a recent Tenth Circuit case, the appellate court employed a
bizarre interpretation of Herringto assess defense evidence demonstrating
that a police officer lied during a suppression hearing. 275 In United States

v. Madden, 276 the court cited both Herring and Davis to support its
conclusion that direct evidence that a particular police officer lied under
oath during a pretrial evidentiary hearing was irrelevant to suppression. As
the appellate court illogically reasoned, "whether Officer Balderrama lied
at the suppression hearing is irrelevant in determining whether the goodfaith exception applies in this case: [because] it has no bearing on the
'objectively ascertainable question whether a reasonably well trained
officer would have known that the search was illegal [.],, 2 7 7 Under Madden,
direct, relevant, and persuasive evidence that a police officer committed
perjury to conceal his illegal search is now irrelevant to the suppression
analysis.278

The second post-Leon prong requires suppression whenever a
magistrate "abandoned his or her judicial role and failed to perform his or
her neutral and detached function. ,,271 In 2010, the Sixth Circuit addressed
this question in the context of a motion to suppress based on
uncontroverted defense evidence that the issuing judge lacked authority
under state law to authorize the warrant. 280 When this question arose in
274

Id. at 649.

275

United States v. Madden, 682 F.3d 920, 928-29 (10th Cir. 2012)

276

[d.

277

Id. at 928.

Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 145-46 (2009) ("The pertinent analysis of
deterrence and culpability is objective, not an inquiry into the subjective awareness of
arresting officers.").
278

279

United States v. Hodge, 246 F.3d 301, 308 (3d Cir. 2001).

210

United States v. Master, 614 F.3d 236, 239-40 (6th Cir. 2010).
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2001 in United States v. Scott, the Sixth Circuit had easily concluded that
the illegally obtained evidence should be suppressed and that any evidence
of reasonable police "good faith" was irrelevant because Leon did not alter
"the probable-cause standard and the various requirements for a valid
warrant." 281 This earlier finding was consistent with pre-Herring
precedent establishing that an officer's "good faith" in executing a warrant
"does nothing to confer legal status upon the deficient warrant" 282 because
"[a]t the core of these various requirements is that the warrant be issued by
a neutral and detached judicial officer. , 2 83 However, in 2010, the court
held that Scott was "no longer viable in light of more recent Supreme
,,284
Court cases.
Herring and Davis have clearly changed the suppression lanscape.
In 2012, the Sixth Circuit again held that the fact that a warrant was issued
by a judge who lacked authority is inadequate defense proof for
suppression..285 In this case, the federal appellate court reasoned that,
because "[a]n error in judgment or a mistake that is not systematic does
not amount to being deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent,, 28 6 then
"[u]nder the Herring balancing test the benefits of deterrence, if any, do
not outweigh the costs. 28 7

211 United States v. Scott, 260 F.3d 512, 515 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that where a
search warrant is "signed by someone who lacks the legal authority necessary to issue
search warrants, the warrant is void ab initio").
282

Id.

28 3

Id. at 515.

284

United States v. Master, 614 F.3d 236, 242 (6th Cir. 2010).

285 United States v. Master, 491 F. App'x 593, 595 (6th Cir. 2012) ("The supposed
'good faith' of the officer who executes the warrant can do nothing to confer legal status
upon the deficient warrant.").
286

Id. at 596.

287

Id. at 597.
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Under the third prong, suppression should be granted if the
defendant proves that the affidavit was so lacking in indicia of probable
cause that no reasonable police officer could believe it was valid. The
Sixth Circuit recently refused to suppress evidence despite defense proof
that previously would have satisfied this prong. In United States v.
Kinison, the court reversed a decision suppressing illegally seized
evidence based on a finding that the magistrate's probable cause
determination was patently unreasonable.288 Citing Davis, the appellate
court held that the suppression "cost-benefit analysis" had been
"recalibrated . . . to focus the inquiry on the 'flagrancy of the police

misconduct' at issue." 289 Suppression was unwarranted in this case
because the defendant lacked proof of deliberate, reckless, or grossly
negligent police misconduct.290
The fourth prong of the post-Leon test contemplates suppression
based on defense proof that the warrant "was so facially deficient that it
failed to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be
seized.",291 In new cases involving facially invalid warrants, the circuits
have, so far, reached varying conclusions. The Tenth Circuit recently held
that, despite defense proof that the search warrant on its face was too
broad, evidence should be admitted unless the defendant could also prove
that the defective warrant was the result of a "flagrant
292
or deliberate violation of rights" under Herring.
The Fifth Circuit recently held that evidence seized pursuant to a
facially invalid warrant (listing the wrong year) should be admitted after
288

United States v. Kinison, 710 F.3d 678, 687 (6th Cir. 2013).

289

Id.at 685 (citing Davis, 131 S.Ct. at 2427).

291Id.(quoting
291

Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009)).

United States v. Primo, 223 F. App'x 187, 189-90 (3d Cir. 2007) (describing the

four exceptions to a finding of Leon reasonable police "good faith").
292 United States v. De La Torre, 543 F. App'x 827, 830 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting
Herring,555 U.S. at 143).
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Herringbecause the mistake was mere negligence and the defendant could
not prove that the police officer's conduct was deliberate or culpable.293
Taking a different approach, the Second Circuit suppressed evidence
seized from a second-floor apartment pursuant to a warrant that identified
a first-floor apartment as the place to be searched.294 This decision was
consistent with a similar case from the Seventh Circuit holding that a
search based on a facially invalid warrant does not meet the Leon
reasonable "good faith" exception and is reckless under Herring.295
Finally, the Sixth Circuit recently suppressed evidence seized during the
search of a house not identified in the warrant noting that, in addition to
the facially invalid warrant, the police officers had falsely informed the
occupant that the warrant was "for this address. 296 These cases suggest a
significant divide in recent cases involving facially invalid warrants.

293

United States v. Guerro, 500 F. App'x 263, 264-65 (5th Cir. 2013).

294

See United States v. Voustianiouk, 685 F.3d 206, 215-16 (2d Cir. 2012) (finding

that the Leon "good faith" exception did not apply and that the culpability requirement of
Herringwas satisfied because nothing in the warrant or affidavit authorized a search of
the second floor apartment); see also United States v. Pineda-Buenaventura, 622 F.3d
761, 776 n.5 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting that the "good faith" exception would not apply
when warrant limited search to apartment A but police searched apartment B and that
such behavior would be reckless under the Herringstandard).
295 United States v. Pineda-Buenaventura, 622 F.3d 761, 776 n.5 (7th Cir. 2010). The
appellate court also reasoned that it was irrelevant under the collective knowledge
doctrine that none of the officers who executed the warrant were aware of its limitation to
a different apartment. See id. ("We agree with the district court's conclusion that the
DEA's failure to properly inform or supervise the executing police of this fact was
reckless, meaning the exclusionary rule is in play.") (citing Herring,555 U.S. at 143).
296 United States v. Shaw, 707 F.3d 666, 667 (6th Cir. 2013).
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3.

SUPPRESSION FOLLOWING WARRANTLESS SEARCHES

a.

Stop and Frisk Cases

Herring and Davis have also begun to shape judicial assessments
of defense evidence seized during illegal stop-and-frisks. In a very recent
decision from the Seventh Circuit, the court addressed the suppression of
evidence based on persuasive defense proof that the officer had lacked
reasonable suspicion under Terry.297 Applying the reasoning of Herring,
United States v. Williams held that courts should admit such evidence
unless the police actions were "sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can
meaningfully deter" similar future actions.298 The court opined that
suppression should be limited to shockingly egregious misconduct because
police officers must be "sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth
the price paid by the judicial system., 29 9 Following a review of the fact,
the Williams court found that the defendant had proved the police officer
"had little articulable reason to suspect that Mr. Williams was armed and
dangerous., 30 0 Thus, in this case, the police officer's misconduct "was
both deliberate
and culpable to an extent that warrants suppression under
30 1
Herring."
b. Traffic Stops
The Sixth Circuit recently addressed the impact of Herring on
suppression motions following traffic stops. As noted above, the Supreme
297

United States v. Williams, 731 F.3d 678, 687 (7th Cir. 2013) (noting that "[n]one

of... [the] facts, alone or together, could have supported a reasonable suspicion that Mr.
Williams was armed and dangerous").
29 8
29 9

3

[d.
Jd. at 687 (quoting Herring,555 U.S. at 144).

1 Id. at

301 Td.

690.
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Court has grated certiorari and heard arguments in the similar case of
30 2 In United States v. Godfrey, the Sixth Circuit
Heien v. North Carolina.
considered the suppression of evidence seized pursuant to a traffic stop
resulting from police error in entering a license plate number into a
computer located in the patrol car, along with the officer's failure to verify
the accuracy of the erroneous notice of an outstanding warrant. 303
According to the court, the evidence should have been admitted because,
under Herring,the defense failed to prove that the search was caused by
"deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent [police misconduct] . . .or...

recurring or systemic negligence." 304 The appellate court relied on a broad
understanding of Herring's impact on warrantless search cases reasoning
that "the Court in Herringheld that the exclusionary rule did not apply to
bar evidence seized after an accidental police error" because "[a]ccidental
typographical mistakes are not the sort of police behavior that suppression
would deter., 30 5 Godfrey is consistent with other recent federal appellate
cases holding that, when police officers seize evidence pursuant to traffic
stops made by mistake, this evidence should be admitted unless the
defendant can prove "systemic error or reckless disregard of constitutional
requirements., 306 This question should be resolved in the 2014-2015
term.30 7
CONCLUSION

There is good reason to worry that, especially in warrantless search
cases, the Roberts Court's faux reasonable police "good faith" standard
312 135 S. Ct. 33 (2014).
303

United States v. Godfrey, 427 F. App'x 409, 410 (6th Cir. 2011).

34

1 Id. at 411.

3 5

1 Id. at 412.

See United States v. Silva, 473 F. App'x 569, 570 (9th Cir. 2012).
317 See supra, note 20.
306
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has covertly returned our criminal courts to a "shocks the conscience"
suppression approach. This is especially evident in the handful of cases
from the federal courts finding that the bad faith standard of Herring and
Davis has been satisfied.
A. RACE-BASED SEIZURES
The Fourth Circuit recently applied Herring to suppress evidence
illegally seized based on an apparently race-based illegal search and
seizure, supported by specific defense proof of an illegal stop. According
to the appellate court:
Two police officers, in a marked patrol cruiser, closely
followed a car from a public road onto private property,
and then blocked the car's exit. The officers observed no
traffic violation. The only assertedly suspicious activity
they saw was the car's presence in a high-crime
neighborhood with out-of-state tags. These facts alone led
the officers to suspect that the car's occupants, four African
American men, were involved in drug trafficking. 308
After an initial determination that this traffic stop constituted a "seizure"
cognizable under the Fourth Amendment,30 9 the court found that "this was
not a routine encounter, but one targeted at Jones [the defendant] ... given
that the officers blocked in Jones's car to effectuate the encounter"3 10 and
that, in their interactions with the defendant, "the officers continued their
show of authority., 3 According to the court, the circumstantial evidence
proffered by the defendant established that the seizure was illegal because
"a review of the totality of the facts in this case requires us to conclude
308 United States v. Jones, 678 F.3d 293, 295 (4th Cir. 2012).
3 9
1 Id.

at 299-300.

31
1 Id.

at 301.

311

1d. at 303.
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that the officers detained Jones before they had any justification for doing
,,312
so.
The Jones court rejected the prosecutor's argument that Herring
should preclude exclusion. 313 According to the Fourth Circuit, under
Herring, when the defendant has proved this this type of egregiously
illegal conduct by a preponderance, "exclusion of evidence ...[is] the
proper remedy in314this case because of the potential . to deter wrongful
police conduct.,
B. RECTAL PROBES
The Sixth Circuit recently concluded that, even after Herring and
Davis, circumstantial defense evidence establishing that a police officer
ordered a rectal search that included involuntary intubation, digital
examination, and the suspect's temporary paralysis, warranted
suppression. 15 United States v. Booker involved a traffic stop for expired
tags during which a K-9 officer thought he smelled marijuana coming
from the suspect's car. 316 The suspect denied the presence of any drugs
and consented to a search. However, while the officer checked the status
of the suspect's license and ascertained the existence of any outstanding
warrants, he noticed the suspect "moving around, as if he was attempting
to conceal something." 317 Although a frisk of the suspect found no
evidence of marijuana sufficient to support an arrest under state law, the
officer handcuffed the suspect, placed him in the back of the patrol car and
312

Id. at 305.

313

Id. at 305, n.7.

311 Jones, 678 F.3d at 305, n.7 (citing Herring,555 U.S. at 137).
315

United States v. Booker, 728 F.3d 535, 548 (6th Cir. 2013).

316

Id. at 537.

317 Id.
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drove him to the police station. 3 18 At the station, officers again frisked the
suspect and "shook his pants by pulling them up until they were loose and
jarring them to dislodge any articles jammed 'inside of his pants or in [his]
boxers."' 319 After nothing was found, they drove the suspect to a medical
center where a digital rectal examination was performed. When nothing
was recovered during this examination, the naked and handcuffed suspect
was subjected to a second rectal examination 320 followed by a more
extensive rectal search performed under sedation. This final search
recovered a rock of crack cocaine.
In a clear illustration that we are returning to a "shocks the
conscience" standard, the appellate court actually began its exclusion
analysis by citing Rochin v. California.321 According to the Sixth Circuit:
The similarity between the present case and Rochin is
apparent. While factual and legal differences exist, what
shocked the conscience in Rochin was the use of the forced
emetic. Forced paralysis, intubation, and digital rectal
examination is at least as shocking as stomach pumping.
The main legal difference is that Rochin analyzed the
practice under the "fundamental fairness" standard of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, while
Booker bases his challenge on the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition of "unreasonable searches," which applies to
the states via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. However, this difference is immaterial
because investigative conduct that would shock the

318

[d.

3 19

Id. at 538.

32

Id. at 538-39.

1

321

Booker, 728 F.3d at 545 (citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952)).
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conscience for purposes of the Due Process Clause
is
"unreasonable" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.3 22
Shortly after the discussion of Rochin, the Booker Court noted that forced
surgery is unconstitutional when "three factors weighed against its
substantive reasonableness: (1) 'the extent to which the procedure may
threaten the safety or health of the individual,' (2) 'the extent of intrusion
upon the individual's dignitary interests in personal privacy and bodily
integrity,' and (3) 'the community's interest in fairly and accurately
determining guilt or innocence.'
323 Thus, Booker suggests
that
circumstantial evidence of this type - because it "shocks the conscience" mandates suppression "notwithstanding the Supreme Court's ruling in
Herring[,] . . . . [because] [b]ased on the circumstances of this case, a
reasonably well-trained officer and physician would have known that the
search was unlawful. 32 4
C. POLICE EXCISION OF SUSPECTED CONTRABAND FROM A
SUSPECT'S PENIS
In a final unforgettable recent case, the Fourth Circuit wisely
opined that courts "cannot discount the real possibility that a suspect may
suffer injuries when a knife is employed, even when it is used to remove
325
contraband from the suspect's genitals in a well-lit and private setting.,
United States v. Edwards arose following a complaint that Edwards had
brandished a gun during a domestic assault. 326 Four police officers
approached Edwards on the street, noting that as they approached they
"were not worried" because he "looked like he was just walking down the
322

Id. at 545-46.

323

Id. at 546 (citing Winstonv. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 761-62 (1985)).

324

Id. at 548.

325

326

United States v. Edwards, 666 F.3d 877, 887-88 (4th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 879.
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street., 3 2 7 As they later testified, Edwards did not pose a threat because he
"did not exhibit any characteristics generally associated with an individual
who is armed., 3 2 8 While waiting for the police transport van to arrive, the
officers patted Edwards down checking everywhere on his person where a
weapon could be concealed.32 9
Unsatisfied with their fruitless pat-down, the officers shined a
flashlight down the front of Edward's underpants and observed a plastic
sandwich bag containing smaller baggies tied in a knot to his penis.
Upon discovering the sandwich baggie tied around
Edwards' penis, another officer held Edwards' pants and
underwear open while Bailey put on gloves, took a knife
that he had in his possession, and cut the sandwich baggie
off Edwards' penis with the knife. After [Officer] Bailey
cut the baggie, he reached into Edwards'
underwear and
33
removed the baggie and its contents. 0
Based on these facts, the Fourth Circuit concluded, "that the search
conducted inside Edwards' underwear is properly characterized as a strip
search, which includes the exposure of a person's
naked body for the
33 1
examination."
physical
or
visual
a
of
purpose
The appellate court considered both Herringand Davis, but found
that, based on the extensive circumstantial evidence of egregiously illegal
police conduct, "the application of the exclusionary rule is especially
appropriate in this case.", 332 In the Edwards court's view, the defense
evidence established the type of "deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent

327

[d.

328

]d. at 880.

32 9
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1 Id.

331
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at
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Edwards, 666 F.3d at 882.
Id. at 885.
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conduct" that "the exclusionary rule serves to deter." "' Finally and
surprisingly, the court opined that this type of search is not especially
uncommon noting that the defense had proffered additional evidence
establishing that "Baltimore City police officers conduct searches inside
the underwear of about 50 percent of arrestees, in the same general
manner as the strip search performed on Edwards. 3 34

D. BACK TO THE FUTURE
Herringand Davis presage a return to the "shocks the conscience"
suppression standard. This "throw-back to highly subjective substantive
due process methodologies" 335 will limit suppression to cases where
defendants can prove illegal police actions that "den[y] the decencies of
civilized conduct. 33 6 Resurrection of the shocks the conscience standard
for all warrant-authorized and warrantless illegal searches will impact our
entire criminal justice system. Prosecutors' easy access to illegally-seized
evidence transforms not just the small number of cases that go to trial, but
also the plea calculations in every case involving evidence that previously
may have been excluded on Fourth Amendment grounds.

333Id. at 885 (citing Herring v.
334

United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009)).

Id. at 886.

335 Lewis v. Sacramento, 523 U.S. 833, 861 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring).
336

Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952); see also Winston v. Lee, 470

U.S. 753, 766 (1985) (finding that forcing a suspect to submit to surgical intrusion for
forensic testing purposes is unlikely to shock the conscience if the societal interest is
great and the physical medical risk is limited); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,
770-71 (1966) (holding that it was permissible for police, over defendant's objections, to
have a doctor take a blood sample); Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 443 (1956)
(explaining that "a blood test taken by a skilled technician [does] not... 'shock[] the
conscience"').

